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Abstract 
Robustness of structural systems is as yet not explicitly defined nor is there a clearly defined 
method for incorporating robustness in design/construction. Robustness can be simply defined 
as the ability of a structural system to survive unforeseen/extraordinary exposures or 
circumstances that would otherwise cause it to fail. The structure must have enough residual 
capacity during and after the event to maintain at least some of its intended function intact. 
The level of robustness of a structure has to be analyzed in terms of the causes and 
consequences of failure; i.e. the consequences of structural damages should not be 
disproportional to the original cause (see 2.1 (3) of EN 1990:2002). This master thesis deals 
with the robustness of bridge structures. It examines common circumstances of failure and 
investigates methods and strategies towards incorporating structural robustness into the design 
of bridges. A robustness analysis is conducted for the Sjölundaviadukten Bridge; a 5-span 
post-tensioned frame bridge in Malmö. 
Keywords: bridges; collapse; robustness; design; strategies; accidental circumstances; train 
derailment; probabilistic methods; failure progression 
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 “A person filled with gumption doesn't sit about stewing about things. He's 
at the front of the train of his own awareness, watching to see what's up the 
track and meeting it when it comes. That's gumption. If you're going to 
repair a motorcycle, an adequate supply of gumption is the first and most 
important tool. If you haven't got that you might as well gather up all the 
other tools and put them away, because they won't do you any good.” 
- Robert M. Pirsig  
(Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance) 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The concept of a bridge could be conjectured to have existed during even the earliest days of 
man; early hunters and gatherers might have used local materials such as fallen trees to cross 
streams or small ravines. Latter day engineering developments such as the invention of the 
structural arch form by the Romans around the first century A.D., however, paved way for the 
modern day concept of a bridge. Since then, bridges have developed into various forms that 
are able to span greater distances and have greater carrying capacities. Technological 
advances have allowed man to create, analyze and construct more complex and grander 
structural bridge systems which are, ironically, seemingly even more vulnerable than the 
bridges of old; some of which still stand today. 
Presently, bridges are designed and constructed to endure what is considered normal use for 
the duration of the structures intended lifetime. This usually only includes foreseeable 
circumstances and exposures expected to occur during the bridges lifespan while low 
probability events are neglected. However, there is always some chance that something 
extraordinary will occur which was either unanticipated or underestimated resulting in bridge 
failure and possibly human casualties. These circumstances can be very diverse and may be 
hard to foresee beforehand, but must not be ignored. 
There has been increased research towards understanding the reasons behind failure and 
progressive collapse of bridges during the past decades through forensic engineering. The 
questions that are being asked are: how and why did this happen; could it have been 
prevented; and whose fault is it? It is possible to investigate collapsed bridge sites after-the-
fact in an effort to understand the reasons behind the failure, however, it is often more 
difficult to try and foresee these circumstances during the design and planning of the bridge; 
hindsight is, as always, 100%. A well known example is the Tacoma Narrows Bridge which 
collapsed in 1940 due to torsional oscillations of the bridge deck stiffening girder caused by 
dynamic effects from wind loading; i.e. vortex shedding. At that time, knowledge of 
aerodynamic phenomena such as wind induced vibrations was not as well developed 
scientifically nor was it as widely known as it is today1; at least not within bridge engineering 
circles that put emphasis on static-load carrying capacity while neglecting the effects of 
dynamics (in fact, the bridge was designed to withstand static wind pressure for wind speeds 
almost three times more than recorded when it collapsed). According to Theodore v. Kármán, 
an engineer/physicist who sat on the federal committee chosen to investigate the failure of the 
bridge, “…the sessions … ended with most of the committee convinced of the worth of the 
new science of aerodynamics in bridge building.” [1] The bridge’s slender and flexible 
stiffening girder was not robust enough to endure the aerodynamic effects caused by the wind 
and this omission in its design was the reason for the collapse. 
                                                 
1 Collapse of bridges due to vibration caused by winds was not, however, unknown; for example, the Wheeling 
Bridge in 1849. See Åkesson 2008 pp. 97-114. 
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The fact remains that bridges have been known to fail due to unexpected or unusual 
circumstances and the significance of these failures must not be taken lightly. The ability of a 
bridge, or structure in general, to survive these circumstances, at least to the extent where 
casualties can be prevented, is referred to as structural robustness; a structural property which 
must be taken into consideration when designing and building a structure. 
1.2 Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is two-fold: (1) to examine and investigate robustness of 
bridge structures in general including circumstances of failure, consequences of collapse, 
methods of quantifying robustness and strategies toward greater structural robustness; and (2) 
a basic analysis of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge, a 5 span post tensioned concrete bridge in 
Malmö, in terms of its structural robustness incorporating the points of discussion from the 
aforementioned objective. In this way a blue print towards incorporating robustness in the 
design and investigation of bridges can be developed. 
1.3 Outline of the thesis 
Chapter 2 discusses the topic of structural robustness in modern day engineering including 
issues of designing structures for robustness. This chapter gives a background to different 
aspects of robustness and its relevance to bridge structures. 
Chapter 3 defines a set of extraordinary exposures that are common circumstances for failure 
of bridges. It includes a general overview of circumstances in which limit state bridge design 
is no longer adequate to the survival of the structure and in which structural robustness 
becomes paramount. 
Chapter 4 discusses the various consequences of failure due to the exposures discussed in 
chapter 3 in terms of structural and safety considerations as well as its impact on the 
surrounding infrastructure. 
Chapter 5 deals with various strategies and methods towards quantifying robustness as well as 
attaining greater structural robustness in bridges. 
Chapter 6 is an investigation of the structural robustness of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge in 
Malmö. The bridge will be analyzed in terms of the relevant exposures and consequences 
based on chapters 3 and 4, which also include a discussion of possible alternative solutions 
which may serve to increase robustness (regarding the strategies and methods discussed in 
chapter 5). 
Chapter 7 is a summary and discussion of results from previous chapters 
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2. Robustness 
2.1 Introduction 
The term robustness is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as something or someone 
having a “robust character or quality”2. The word robust is synonymous with strength and 
resilience; from Latin rōbustus, from rōbur meaning strength. This makes sense in a 
colloquial dictum when referring to, for example, a person’s build or a full-bodied wine, but 
its usage is quite ambiguous with regard to “engineering terminology”. In reference to the 
latter, terms such as strength and resilience require a more quantitative description as well as 
a specific association; for example, a concrete reinforced beam can be described in terms of 
its flexural strength, or more notably, its resistance to external loading. The following sections 
aim to more clearly define what is referred to as structural robustness and its application 
within structural engineering and more specifically, for bridge structures. 
2.2 Robustness in engineering 
Robustness can have various meanings in differing fields of science and technology including 
statistical or probabilistic investigation/interpretation, pharmaceutical procedure, ecological 
systems, genetics, and software development to name a few. Typically the general scientific 
interpretation of robustness can broadly be defined as the manner in which a “system” is 
affected by hazardous/extreme or varying procedures or circumstances. However, in order to 
measure and rank the degree of robustness of a specific system, certain elements must first be 
clarified (Maes et. al. 2006):  
1. The system must be clearly defined. 
2. The intended functions/objectives of the system must be identified. 
3. The perturbations (eg. hazards, endogenous an exogenous circumstances, deviations 
from design assumptions, etc.)  which affect the system are identified. 
4. The overall consequences of individual perturbations are analyzed with regard to the 
aforementioned functions/objectives. 
5. The level of robustness can then be obtained and ranked with all this in mind3. 
The resulting robustness is unique to that system alone and cannot be applied generally to 
other systems. Refer to figure 2.1 for a schematic for the process of assessing robustness.  
                                                 
2 Oxford English Dictionary <www.oed.com> 
3 Methods of ranking robustness are discussed in section 5 
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Figure 2.1 Schematic of the process of assessing robustness (Maes et al. 2006) 
It is important to note that some of the input parameters utilized for a robustness assessment 
may be assumed or contain uncertainties which also need to be taken into account during 
analysis; this is referred to as risk. 
The aforementioned interpretation of robustness and its assessment can be applied within 
engineering but an explicit definition specific to structures is still lacking. Thus, robustness as 
a property within structural engineering systems will be, for the purposes of clarification, 
referred to as structural robustness. 
2.3 What is structural robustness? 
The partial collapse of the Ronan Point Tower in east London due to a gas explosion in May 
1968 was when the robustness of structures first received significant attention within the 
engineering community. It prompted much research towards implementing counter-measures 
against progressive collapse in buildings and enhancing overall structural integrity as well as 
introducing design requirements for accidental loading into the UK Codes of Practice and 
regulatory requirements in the early 1970s; one of the earliest examples of regulations of this 
kind being included in structural or building codes (Gulvanessian et al. 2006). However, there 
has since been a revival of interest in structural robustness as well as an increase of 
internationally funded research following recent terrorist attacks including the collapse of the 
WTC on September 11, 2001. A good example of this is the EU COST (European 
Cooperation in Science and Technology) action TU 0601 [2], initiated in 2007 by the JCSS 
(Joint Committee on Structural Safety), which “…aims to develop a foundation for treatment 
of structural robustness in future structural design codes. “ [3] 
Despite this increased attention towards structural robustness there is as yet no consensus as 
to a universal interpretation of structural robustness nor is there an explicit framework for its 
application in design and execution. However, something that everybody seems to agree upon 
is that unanticipated or progressive collapse should be avoided; one way of doing this is 
through structural robustness. 
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The European building standard Eurocode defines robustness as: “the ability of a structure to 
withstand events like fire, explosions, impact or the consequences of human error, without 
being damaged to an extent disproportionate to the original cause.” (prEN1991-1-7:2003) 
Similar definitions are given by other building standards around the world including in 
Denmark, Switzerland and Italy. The following definitions of structural robustness and 
progressive collapse will be used for the purposes of this paper. 
Structural robustness: 
 Structural robustness is the property of a structural system which enables it to 
survive extraordinary exposures and circumstances, beyond the scope of 
conventional design criteria, without disproportional1 damage or loss of 
function. 
1- The degree of acceptable disproportion should be prescribed in the design requirements for the structural 
system being analyzed 
As an addition to the above definition the terms structural system and survival need to be 
clarified. 
Structural system:  
It is difficult to state a short and concise definition of a structural system. A complex 
theoretical interpretation of a system has been developed by G. Ropohl in Systems Theory of 
Engineering (1979). It combines functional, structural and hierarchical concepts of a system 
and is valid for deterministic, stochastic, dynamic and static systems (Stempfle et al. 2005). A 
general definition will be formulated with basis on Stempfle et al. (2005): 
 A structural system is the complex composition of a variety of subsystems whose 
attributes, functionality and interrelations constitute the overall structural system. 
The interactions between the subsystems and the factors which influence them 
constitute the entire system. The set of subsystems are defined in the same way as 
the parent system with their own subsystems and thus creating a hierarchy of 
systems. The lowest level of subsystems within the hierarchy is defined as an 
element; the degree of segmentation is dependent on the type of analysis being 
done. The structural system is limited in time, space and purpose. 
The structural system in this case refers not only to the physical bridge structure but also 
external influences including relevant perturbations (such as loading, fatigue, deterioration, 
etc.), inspection procedures, maintenance and reparations during the structures lifetime. 
A structural system can be categorized into two fundament types (JCSS Probabilistic model 
code 2001): 
1. Series system: system fails if one or more of its components fail 
2. Parallel system: system fails when all of its components fail 
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Survival:  
 In terms of structural robustness, the term survival refers to the preservation of 
the intended function of the structure regardless of circumstance. This may 
include limited damage or a reduction/loss of function limited in time (Knoll et 
al. 2009). 
NOTE: Robustness can also be defined as a structure’s insensitivity to local failure (Starossek 
2009) and is thus a property of the structure alone independent of possible causes of initial 
local failure. 
Progressive collapse: 
 Progressive collapse is characterized by a disproportion in size between a 
damaging exposure event and the resulting collapse (Starossek 2009). 
A significant aspect of structural robustness is the insensitivity of a structure to progressive 
collapse. 
2.4 Robustness in design 
2.4.1 Current design methods 
Structural systems are usually designed to survive a set of foreseeable circumstances, which 
may be expected to occur, to a certain degree or magnitude, during the structure’s service 
lifetime; i.e. a list of anticipated exposure and events given by structural and building codes. 
Modern day design codes are based on structural reliability theory utilizing a framework of 
probabilistic-based design in which an acceptable probability of failure (or margin of safety) 
is decided by code committees (Melchers 1999). In simple terms, this is done by modeling 
statistical distributions to represent an action effect S and the corresponding resistance R; 
these distributions are based on samples of collected data, typically of the order of 25-50 
years (Ellingwood 2001). The margin of safety is defined as the difference between these two 
distributions, Z = R – S. The probability of failure is then: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫=<= dxxfxFZPp SRf 0  (2.1) 
where ( )xFR  is the cumulative distribution function of the resistance R and ( )xfS  is the 
probability density function of action effect S.  
In order to manage risks, such as unfavorable deviations or inaccurate assessments of actions 
or resistances, modern structural standards introduce so called safety factors, γ , into the 
design equations; these are also based on structural reliability theory. This can simply be 
represented in the following form: 
∑ ⋅> niSiRn SR γγ/  (2.2) 
in which both the resistance and action effects are specified conservatively. 
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There is, however, an inadequacy of current design methods with regard to structural 
robustness. There are three main reasons for this (Starossek 2006). Firstly, structural codes 
focus on component based design at a local level and thus fail to address the safety of the 
structural system as a whole; i.e. they do not take into account system responses to local 
failure. Secondly, unforeseen or improbable actions are not taken into account since 
supporting empirical data is unavailable. This is significant for non-robust structures where 
the combined low probabilities of local failure may lead to unacceptably high probabilities of 
global failure. Finally, structural reliability theory depends on specified acceptable 
probabilities of failure which are difficult to adjust with regard to disproportionate collapse. 
Taking into account the extreme consequences of low probability events associated with 
progressive collapse it is difficult to derive an acceptable failure probability. 
Thus, it seems that structural robustness cannot be fully achieved using current reliability 
based approaches. The current design methods should rather be complemented by additional 
measures with particular focus on creating more robust structures. 
2.4.2 Robustness through design 
Some modern day building code, including Eurocode, require that a structural system be 
robust but do not offer much in the way of aiding the engineer with achieving this demand. 
This, of course, allows for much interpretation on the part of the engineer as to what exactly 
has to be done with regard to robust design. 
For example, EN 1990:2002 (Basis of structural design), clause 2.1, has this to say regarding 
structural robustness: 
“(4)P A structure shall be designed and executed in such a way that it will not be damaged by 
events such as : 
‐ explosions 
‐ impact, and 
‐ the consequences of human errors, 
to an extent disproportionate to the original cause. 
(5)P Potential damage shall be avoided or limited by appropriate choice of one or more of the 
following : 
‐ avoiding, eliminating or reducing the hazards to which the structure can be subjected; 
‐ selecting a structural form which has low sensitivity to the hazards considered; 
‐ selecting a structural form and design that can survive adequately the accidental 
removal of an individual member or a limited part of the structure, or the occurrence 
of acceptable localized damage; 
‐ avoiding as far as possible structural systems that can collapse without warning; 
‐ tying the structural members together.” 
Although the above requirements do include some prescriptive design requirements as to how 
a structure in general may be indirectly designed to try and avoid disproportionate failure 
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(such as tying structural members) it seems to rather state the demand for a robustly designed 
structural system while leaving much interpretation as to its implementation for specific types 
of structures. Elements, strategies and methods towards structural robustness have recently 
been reviewed by Knoll and Vogel (2009).  
A significant problem with incorporating robustness into current design methods is the need 
for some measure of quantification of robustness of structural systems. Otherwise the term 
only lends itself to subjective and almost philosophical interpretation. If a framework for the 
quantification of robustness can be explicitly established (and accepted), then certain 
limitations can be introduced with regard to ensuring structural robustness during design; i.e. 
an acceptable limit of disproportionality between consequences of damage and exposures is 
established. Currently there exist various methods of quantifying structural robustness; refer 
to section 5 for an overview. These recently developed approaches towards robust design, 
however, remain scattered and can be quite ambiguous at times (Knoll et al. 2009). 
Furthermore, only a few of these methods can be applied to bridges and seem to focus rather 
on building structures. 
2.5 Robustness of bridges 
Prior to considering robustness in the design of any structure, the significance of the failure or 
malfunction of that structure must be accounted for; i.e. is structural robustness necessary and 
if so, to what degree. It is important to incorporate this within the specified design 
requirements of the structure in question. The consequences of collapse with regard to 
material and immaterial losses, safety, direct effects to the surrounding infrastructure and 
additional effects must be accounted for (Starossek 2006). Thus, the first step needed before 
robustness of bridges can be investigated is to establish whether there is a need for robust 
design of bridges. There are, of course, varying requirements of robustness depending on the 
bridge being investigated 
Arbitrarily, a bridge is a structural system required to span a physical obstacle such as a 
valley, river, road, etc., providing a passage between two points. Bridges usually transport 
people or materials in one form or another between these two points and may also act as 
“tunnels” for passage under its span. The consequence of the collapse of a bridge is 
significant in the fact that the safety of its users may be compromised but also that the 
surrounding infrastructure object that are reliant on the bridge will be directly affected; not to 
mention the costs associated with collapse. In light of these effects, it seems obvious that 
bridge structures are required to be robust. 
There exists a problem nowadays with the ability to try and foresee possible changes of 
structural demands in bridges over their long service life (Stempfle et al. 2005). Traffic 
demands are rising with time which in turn increases the magnitude of actual live loading and 
the repair of bridges is becoming more difficult considering this increase of traffic density; i.e. 
since the bridge must somehow maintain partial functionality during repair. Furthermore, the 
greater the traffic density is on the bridge, the greater the consequence of collapse with regard 
to user and structural safety. To help achieve a greater insensitivity to collapse, the inclusion 
of structural robustness as a property of bridges could be used. 
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The application of structural robustness specifically to bridges structures can be done by more 
specifically defining terms given in earlier sections. First of all, the structural system being 
investigated is a bridge system and, unlike buildings, their subsystem components are all 
designated for some structural purpose. It could be argued that most bridge systems are series 
systems since many of its components may be classified as critical elements which are 
integral to the survival of the structure as a whole; i.e. the failure of one of these components 
may result in global failure. For example, bridge pylons and abutments are designed to 
distribute vertical reaction forces from the bridges deck to the foundations and the bridge deck 
may not be designed with enough residual capacity if one of the supports were removed. On 
the other hand, if a single cable snaps in a cable-stayed bridge it does not necessarily mean 
that this will result in failure of the adjoining bridge spans. Each bridge should be examined 
on a case by case basis while it may be possible to prescribe certain design requirements for 
some bridge types. 
An arbitrary structural bridge system can be divided into sub-systems according to systems 
theory (section 2.3) along with corresponding attributes, interrelations and functionality. The 
elements within a bridge system – the lowest level of sub-systems within the system hierarchy 
– are structural component such as walls, beams, slabs, foundations, cables, etc. The super-
system of a bridge structure is comprised of the infrastructure systems in the surrounding 
environment, i.e. the transportation network, with elements such as roads, railways, sea routes 
etc. The transport network (super-system) is reliant on the bridge system at a local level in 
that the latter is significant in maintaining the function of the former and the consequence of 
bridge failure results in direct consequence to the transportation network, such as road 
closure. 
The primary function of most bridge structures is to maintain a safe and continuous flow of 
traffic in whatever form; i.e. pedestrian, cycle, vehicular, train or ship. This function is 
maintained via the combined interactions of its structural components which comprise the 
sub-systems of the bridge system. Localized failure to one of more components will create 
direct consequence to the relative structural elements which may lead to indirect consequence 
on a more global level (such as progressive collapse). Therefore it is important to understand 
the relations between sub-systems and their significance on the system as a whole. Figure 2.2 
shows a general example for the hierarchical division of subsystems for an arbitrary multi-
span concrete frame bridge. 
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Figure 2.2 Hierarchical division of subsystems in a multi-span bridge system 
The next step in assessing structural robustness of bridges is to identify the circumstances and 
exposures that have the potential to cause global failure (collapse) of the bridge. These 
exposure events can be very diverse depending on the type of bridge being analyzed, its 
surrounding environment including climactic and natural conditions, access to the bridge, etc. 
It is important to note that the inclusion of certain accidental load scenarios are defined in 
many codes for bridge design (eg. EN 1991-3:1995 4.7 for accidental loads from vehicles on 
bridges), and as these actions are considered a priori, they may not constitute the 
extraordinary or unusual exposures that are considered for robust design. However, the 
probability of occurrence and expected intensity of these exposures may be underestimated or 
unknown and as such should not be fully ignored with regard to robust design. 
Once the exposures have been identified, their relative consequences (refer to section 4) to the 
intended functions of the bridge can be accounted for and an analysis of bridge robustness can 
be carried out. Methods of robust analysis have been developed, however, that consider the 
actual damages, direct or indirect, to the bridge system rather than the specific cause since a 
specified damage mode may have a variety of causes (see section 5); these will be briefly 
mentioned in this paper. 
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3. Circumstances for failure 
3.1 General overview 
The growth of structural forensic engineering as an active professional field in the modern 
day engineering world leaves much to be said about the increase of structural failures today. 
In an ideal world, the need for such investigation would become unnecessary and structures 
would perform as intended. However, “…demands of rapid economic development, increased 
design sophistication, more and more daring construction technology, and accelerated project 
delivery increase the number of [structural] failures throughout the world…” (Ratay 2007) In 
light of this, it has become even more paramount not to take short-cuts and neglect issues 
regarding structural robustness during the design and execution of structures. The first step in 
trying to understand problems with robustness and collapse of bridges is to identify the 
relative circumstances for which failure may occur. 
Investigations of actual bridge failures have been collected and summarized by Åkesson 
(2008), Sheer (2000) and Wardhana et al. (2003) to name a few. It is important to build upon 
the results of investigations such as these as a basis for research of robustness of bridges. 
Clearly the bridges were not adequately robust and the analysis of their failure helps to 
identify recurring collapse-promoting features. Most bridge failures occur during the 
construction phase of the structural systems lifespan, such as failure of scaffolding during 
erection (Galambos 2008). However, the focus of this paper will be on bridge failures that 
occur during the working life of a bridge; i.e. while it is in operation.  
The mechanism of a bridge collapse can be traced back to one or more triggering events, of 
either discrete or continuous nature, which may cause local failures that in turn could progress 
leading to a global failure of the systems functions either instantaneously or over time. In 
general, the total probability of collapse, ( )CP , can be represented as a chain of partial 
probabilities in the following form: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ∩=
i j
iijij EPEDPEDFPCP ||  (3.1) 
where 
( )iEP   is the probability of an exposure iE occurring ( )ij EDP |   is the probability of damage given exposure iE  ( )ij EDFP ∩|  is the probability of global failure given local damage jD due to exposure iE  
This equation serves as a good indicator of the various factors that can bring about the 
collapse of a structure in an effort to minimize the chance of it occurring. The terms in 
equation (3.1) in the context of collapse resistance are as shown in figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 Terms in collapse probability equations in context of collapse resistance (Starossek et al. 2008) 
The aim is to increase robustness through maximizing collapse resistance and minimizing the 
structures vulnerability4 as well as the probability of hazards occurring. The last term is often 
difficult to identify and control compared to the first two. The term ( )ij EDFP ∩|  helps in 
expressing the robustness of the structure and ( )ij EDP |  refers to the property of the exposed 
elements to resist the hazard iE . The latter is included in standard structural design while 
robustness is as yet not explicitly incorporated into code based design. 
The different hazard scenarios – the circumstance in which structural resistance is somehow 
overcome, damaging, impairing or altering the structures original state – are very diverse and 
it is difficult to try and identify them all and analyze each one individually. This is where 
robustness as a design specification could help in compensating for these circumstances. 
Generally, the circumstances for failure of bridges, or any structural system, can be divided 
into two distinct categories: endogenous or exogenous perturbations (i.e. internal flaws or 
external causes). For example, an endogenous perturbation might be that the design resistance 
of a key member in the bridge is less than was calculated while an exogenous perturbation 
might be a ship collision to a pylon, overloading of the bridge deck or chloride attacks of a 
concrete bridge deck. Conclusions drawn from forensic investigations following structural 
failures often find that the reason for collapse is a combination of causes relating to both 
categories (Knoll et al. 2009). 
3.2 Internal flaws 
The internal attributes/state of a bridge structure and its varying sub-components is an 
important topic with regard to the robustness of a bridge. The probabilistic-based design of a 
bridge assumes that the variation of structural properties, such as strength, ductility, etc., used 
in the analytical/mathematical structural model compared to the real values in the actual 
physical structure will be within acceptable, or legitimate, bounds through the utilization of 
safety margins in the limit state equations (left side in equation 2.2). These variations follow a 
                                                 
4 Vulnerability as a property of structures is discussed further in section 5 
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statistical distribution for random data, usually Gaussian, developed through past research. In 
addition to the use of safety margins, testing, inspection and quality control procedures are 
performed in an effort to eliminate any extreme variations. However, the involvement of 
humans in a process of production or execution of structural systems/subsystems of which 
these structural properties adhere indicate that these variations are subject to the consequences 
of human error; a phenomena for which no probability law currently exists (Knoll et al. 
2009). Human error can occur during all stages of the bridges development and lifespan: 
• Error during design - inadequate resistance, ductility, etc. 
• Error during construction - poorly chosen building procedures, poor communication, 
etc. 
• Error during operation - inadequate inspection, maintenance, reparations, etc. 
All three types of human errors listed above may result in internal flaws in the bridge 
structure. 
Gross human error is therefore a significant element of the internal flaw hazard scenario. One 
way to try and decrease its impact is through quality control during the design and 
construction processes; i.e. a filtering process which tries to eliminate the larger variations in 
structural properties during design (by checking calculations, drawings, etc.), construction 
(supervision on site) and operation (periodic maintenance and inspection, etc.). There is no 
way, however, to completely eliminate the possibility of gross human errors occurring. The 
only way to compensate for its consequences is with adequate structural robustness. 
3.3 External exposures 
A bridge structure is subject to a wide variety of exogenous perturbations throughout its 
service life continuously testing the capacity of the structure. This section will focus on 
exposures not included in normal design of bridges. However, in some cases the effect of 
anticipated exposures to an unanticipated degree may result in the collapse of a bridge. 
Furthermore, flaws in the design or construction of the structure may result in failure even in 
the absence of extraordinary or unanticipated circumstances. Research of collapsed bridges 
helps to identify certain recurring circumstances of collapse which can then aid for future 
design in which these circumstances are taken into account. 
If a sufficient amount of data exists for an external hazard scenario it can be included in the 
design of the bridge through analytical or testing procedures; i.e. either mathematical or 
physical modeling. This should be done with regard to the consequences of specific exposures 
to the system as a whole and not only via usual component based design. A localized 
component of a bridge may be designed such that it is sufficiently resilient to extraordinary 
hazard scenarios, however, this is sometimes not cost efficient or pragmatically plausible in 
all cases (Knoll et al. 2009). This issue will be touched upon in section 5. 
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It is important to try and get a deeper understanding of common failure scenarios when 
analyzing the robustness of a bridge structure. The following are some key external exposures 
that could result in structural failure of bridges: 
¾ Overloading 
‐ This may include anticipated loading of a flawed structure 
¾ Accidents 
‐ eg. collisions, fires, etc. 
¾ Fatigue/deterioration 
‐ Although the structure is designed to withstand the individual exposures and 
events, the cumulative effect of various exposures, such as chemical attacks, 
dynamic loading, etc, could cause the structure to weaken and then in time fail. 
¾ Malevolence (purposeful destruction) 
¾ Natural events 
‐ eg. floods, extreme weather, etc. 
The cause of the damage could also be any combination of these. It is therefore hard to 
identify explicit design criteria which take all of these into account; however, certain methods 
have been developed to help incorporate robustness into the design of a structure.  
While the internal flaws discussed in the previous section creates uncertainties in the 
resistance of the structure (left side in eq. (2.2)), the variety and randomness of external 
perturbations effecting the structure also introduce uncertainty into its design (right side in  
eq. (2.2)). These safety margins are chosen with the aid of statistical and probabilistic analysis 
of empirical data in order to account for deviations between mathematical/analytical models 
and the real structure. However, forensic investigation following the collapse of structures 
often recognizes that collapse was not the result of poorly chosen safety margins or factors 
during design, but was caused by something altogether unanticipated (Knoll et al. 2009). 
3.4 Hierarchy of failure modes 
The previous sections give a general overview of the different types of extraordinary or 
unanticipated exposures that may bring about the collapse of a bridge system. These 
exposures may, however, cause bridges to fail in different ways in which different failure 
modes must be considered. Each mode of failure gives a description of the course of events 
leading up to collapse including the consequences to the bridge system (Knoll et al. 2009). It 
is possible to identify these different scenarios and rank the varying degrees of failure/damage 
to the bridge system using probabilistic methods. From equation (3.1) it is noted that for each 
initiating event Ei there are varying local damages Dj that may be expected to occur. The 
degree of sensitivity of the bridge system to global failure from the local damages will differ 
such that a hierarchy of failure modes may be extracted; i.e. the consequences of each failure 
mode must be considered (see section 4). A robust bridge structure is one that is more 
insensitive to global failure given the worst-case failure mode; i.e. the bridge system develops 
less catastrophic failure modes. 
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In order to ascertain a hierarchy of different failure modes for a bridge structure, actual 
conditions must be considered without the use of load or resistance factors. This is difficult to 
model exactly and especially a-priori (i.e. prior to completion of structure) since the degree of 
deviation between the designed (idealized) and built structure cannot be evaluated until after 
its completion; and even then it cannot be determined exactly – the bridge cannot be tested 
directly for robustness. The use of stochastic (probabilistic) design methods with regards to 
robustness evaluation is then very helpful in considering these deviations and obtaining a 
hierarchy of failure modes. 
Once the relevant hazard scenarios for a bridge structure have been identified and all failure 
modes considered, the mechanism of collapse can be determined. The system’s response to a 
specific exposure can be traced. It is analogous to a row of dominoes toppling over one after 
the other; damage to one component propagates to another and ultimately leading to collapse.  
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Figure 3.2 Schematic representation of damage initiation and propagation for arbitrary bridge system 
Figure 3.2 is a schematic representation of damage initiation and propagation for a structural 
bridge system and is analogous with equation (3.1) where: 
Sk structural bridge system set 
S’k  sub-system set within structural bridge system S’k (eg. bridge pylon) 
S0 super-system to structural bridge system S’k (i.e. surrounding infrastructure) 
∞0 infinity set (parent set to S0) 
E’i, Ei endogenous exposure set (i.e. internal flaws for S’k and Sk) 
Ee∞  the set of all external perturbations that could affect the bridge system 
Ee0 subset of Ee∞ originating from within the surrounding infrastructure S0 (such as 
train, vehicle or ship collision) 
Ej external exposure event j  
Dj damage state j associated with event Ej 
As an example: a truck collides with a bridge support (Ej) causing a damage state Dj to one of 
the bridge pylons (S’k) which may contain internal flaws (E’i). The connection between the 
pylon and bridge deck may be flawed (Ei). The damage to the pylon leads to a global failure, 
F, of the bridge system which in turn affects the surrounding transport infrastructure (S0). The 
corresponding probabilities are also given: P(Xi|Yj ∩ Zk) where Xi, Yj, and Zk are random 
variables. (NOTE: If the external exposure, Ej, were for example, a derailed train then it 
would originate from set Ee0). 
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4. Consequences of failure 
4.1 Consequences to structural system 
The key aspect of a robust structure is its ability to maintain an acceptable degree of 
functionality after a damaging event occurs or, alternatively, partially lose functionality for a 
limited period of time. For a bridge, the main function is to maintain traffic flow while some 
damage may be acceptable in that it is localized or to a degree in which its function is only 
partially affected or limited in time. Thus an acceptable degree of global consequence (i.e. 
consequences to the entire system) may be specified on a case by case basis. In some extreme 
cases it may be acceptable that a bridge loose total functionality while user safety can be 
ensured. Eurocode 0 proposes so called consequences classes considering the failure or 
malfunction of a structure (EN 1990:2002): 
¾ CC1 
o “High consequence for loss of human life, or economic, social or 
environmental consequences very great” 
¾ CC2 
o “Medium consequences for loss of human life, economic, social or 
environmental consequences considerable” 
¾ CC3 
o “Low consequences for loss of human life, and economic, social or 
environmental consequences small or negligible” 
These consequences classes correspond to different reliability classes which prescribe 
acceptable limits for structural failure probabilities as a basis of design for structures in 
general. A reliability index, β, is defined which is determined as the inverse standardized 
normal distribution of the probability of failure, Pf. (EN 1990:2002) 
( )yearfn Pn 1.1 ⋅Φ−= −β  (4.1) 
 n  reference period in years  
Pf.1year  probability of structural failure for a reference period of 1 year 
Table 4.1 shows the target reliabilities indices for reference periods of 1 and 50 years 
according to Eurocode for ultimate limit state design (i.e. design concerning safety of people 
and/or structure). The reliability classes RC3, RC2 and RC1 correspond to the consequence 
classes CC3, CC2 and CC1. 
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Table 4.1 Recommended minimum reliability indices for different classes according to Eurocode (EN 1990:2002) 
 
The aforementioned description of global consequence of structural failure or malfunction 
includes subjective terminology such as high, medium or low consequences which is hard to 
quantify in terms of structural robustness. It could be argued that a non robust structure is one 
in which high consequences come as a result of low probability events. Otherwise, if the 
consequences were low, there would be less desire for a robust structure. 
The definition of structural robustness proposed in section 2.3 states that the consequences of 
failure or malfunction should not be disproportional to the original cause. It would thus be 
advantageous to somehow be able to quantify these consequences. One way of doing this is 
by utilizing risk assessment methodology in which different forms of consequences (i.e. 
inconvenience to system users, injuries, fatalities and/or financial cost) are considered and can 
be combined into a scalar measure, termed utility/disutility (Baker et al. 2006). This method 
of quantifying consequences will not be discussed in detail in this paper. 
In general there are two types of consequence that can be considered; direct and indirect 
consequences. The prior refers to the consequences that occur as a direct result of the 
damaging action while indirect consequences are associated with subsequent system failures. 
A consequence analysis thus includes a check of the individual components of the structure 
and their contribution to the overall structural system including a description of possible 
failure mechanisms and the associated consequences of local failure, direct and indirect, on a 
global level.  
It must be noted that the triggering event in some cases may be altogether unanticipated or 
unknown. Knoll et al. (2009) made a comparison of a robust structure to a living being which 
must be prepared to survive unforeseen circumstances in order to maintain its own survival; 
i.e. survival of the fittest in which evolution favors the robust structure to survive. However, 
in cases where certain extreme hazard scenarios are identified, a detailed analysis may be 
carried in an effort to obtain the consequences of such events in proportion to the original 
cause. 
The first step in assessing the consequences of a damaging event (or of a variety of damaging 
events) is to identify the different failure modes (i.e. mechanisms of failure) that may occur 
for a given bridge structure. This refers to the mechanism of collapse in which a triggering 
event that causes damage/failure to a specific structural component leads to the subsequent 
damage/failure of other components and in this way possibly leading to the collapse of the 
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entire structure. The direct and indirect consequence of each propagating action can then be 
analyzed separately to try and identify key collapse-promoting features and extract possible 
counter-measures (Starossek 2009). A typology and classification of progressive collapse of 
structures has been researched by Starossek (2009) and will not be specifically mentioned in 
this paper. 
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4.2 Consequences to super-system 
The super system for a bridge structure is the surrounding infrastructure including transport 
networks such as road, railway, marine and pedestrian networks. Their reliance on the bridge 
structure itself is relatively localized but the failure of the latter may have varying degrees of 
consequences to the infrastructure network. This is heavily dependent on the layout 
(topology) of the network and location of the bridge within that network 
The function of the super system is not that different from the bridge system itself in that it 
should maintain traffic flow, however it can do this via various routes. Furthermore, the 
infrastructure network is in effect a living entity in that it constantly changes with time; i.e. 
the distribution of traffic flow constantly changes, user demand may vary and the geometric 
layout may even change – eg. new arteries are created or old ones rebuilt and temporarily 
closed. 
A topology of the infrastructure network can be created and its functionality assessed using 
methods of traffic design; these methods will not be discussed in this paper. The impact of a 
bridge failing on the infrastructure network can then be ascertained by comparing the intact 
and impaired infrastructure system. The consequences of bridge failure within an 
infrastructure system are varied and the super-system’s robustness may be evaluated using 
similar methods related to structural robustness 
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5. Strategies & methods of Robustness 
5.1 Introduction 
There have been some methods and strategies developed towards quantifying robustness or 
similar attributes (vulnerability, collapse resistance, etc.) and achieving greater robustness in 
structures recently but they remain scattered and thus far no general approach has been 
universally accepted regarding design for robustness. For the most part, recent developments 
of methods and strategies for robust design have focused on structural building systems while 
to a lesser degree for structural bridge systems (Starossek 2009). This is probably due largely 
to the significance of recent building collapses such as the WTC in New York, 2001, and the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995. 
5.2 Methods for quantification of Robustness 
Currently there exist various methods and approaches for the quantification of robustness or 
similar structural properties (eg. vulnerability) which have been developed in the past few 
years including probabilistic measures of vulnerability (Lind 1995), detailed risk-consequence 
analysis (Maes et. al. 2006) and probabilistic risk assessment (Baker et al. 2006) to name a 
few (see also Agarwal et al. 2003, Smith 2006 and Wisniewski et al. 2007). Starossek et al. 
(2008) have comprised these approaches and distinguished them into two prominent 
categories: measures based on (1) structural behavior (or performance) and (2) structural 
attributes of systems. A basis for robustness quantification was developed and further sub-
categorization determined as shown in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1 Basis for quantification of robustness and similar properties (Starossek et al. 2008) 
5.2.1 Based on structural behavior 
Methods for the quantification of robustness based on structural behavior – also known as 
performance based behavior – of a structure are further divided into two prominent categories: 
probabilistic and deterministic measures. These methods examine the structural system in 
terms of structural responses to exposures or their equivalent damages.  
5.2.1.1 Probabilistic measures 
Probabilistic analysis of robustness investigates the failure probability or risk for a structure. 
The difference being that the latter takes into account the degree of consequence for a given 
hazard scenario, while the prior compares the damaged and undamaged states of the structural 
system. 
One approach is based on the concept of vulnerability – or inversely the damage tolerance – 
which is the ratio of the failure probabilities for a damaged system to an undamaged system 
(Lind 1995). In essence it measures the structural effects of an assumed damage to a system 
indicating its relative increased sensitivity to further damage. The quantitative measure of 
vulnerability can be written in the following form: 
( ) ( )( )SRP
SRPSRVV dd ,
,,
0
==  (5.1) 
Where ( )SRP ,  denotes the failure probability of a system for a set of system states R for the 
prospective loading set S. The undamaged system states R0 are a product of the ordinary 
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loading set S0 which affect the system without damaging it. The damage spectrum for which 
vulnerability is to be considered is given by Rd. 
Maes et al. (2006) determined a similar approach which compares system failure probabilities 
of an undamaged system state, 0sP , and a damaged state, siP (i.e. the system failure 
probability for an undamaged system versus the system failure probability for a system with 
one impaired member/element i): 
si
s
i P
PR 0min=   (5.2) 
The aforementioned probabilistic methods, however, fail to take into account the 
consequences of system failure. Maes et al. (2006) also proposed a more detailed risk-
consequence analysis of a structural system which compares the hazard intensity (X) with a 
cost associated with the consequences of failure (CF). In this way a function of failure 
consequence versus hazard intensity can be plotted and the probability of exceedance 
obtained by integrating over the probability density function of the hazard itself. A measure of 
robustness is also proposed. 
A probabilistic risk assessment based approach has been introduced by Baker et al. (2006) 
which defines robustness as the proportionality of consequences of structural damage to the 
cause. A so called robustness index is formulated as a quantification of robustness. This 
approach will be discussed in more detail in section 5.2.3. 
5.2.1.2 Deterministic measures 
The deterministic approaches towards quantification of robustness in some cases also 
compare the original and damaged state of a system. However, they differ from probabilistic 
methods in that they do not incorporate failure probabilities or require statistical input data. 
For example, Maes et al. (2006) determined a measure based on the so-called reserve strength 
ratio (RSR) which compares the system strength in a damaged and undamaged state (denoted 
by i and 0 respectively): 
0
min
RSR
RSRR i
i
=   (5.3) 
A similar measure has been determined by Wisniewski et al. (2006). Other approaches 
formulated include Starossek (2009) which analyzes the extent of damage progression of a 
system and Smith (2006), an energy based approach comparing progressive collapse of a 
structure with the fast fracture theory of metals. 
In all aforementioned cases, the deterministic robustness approaches do not take into account 
the consequences of failure which, as was stated in previous sections, have been deemed 
pertinent to the assessment of robustness of structures. 
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which are either classified as direct, CDir, or indirect, CInd, consequences (refer to section 4.1). 
Thus in the case where failure of the system does not occur (F̅), there are only direct 
consequences to the system. While in the case where failure does occur (F), there is an 
additional indirect consequence to the system due to damage state D. And of course if no 
damage occurs to the system (D̅) for an exposure event EXBD then there are no consequences, 
C = 0. 
While current design codes incorporate a check of possible damage scenarios and resulting 
consequences, such that their proportionality can be checked, the robustness measure 
proposed by Baker et al. (2006) requires that the probability of the originating exposures be 
included for the quantification of robustness. 
The variety of possible exposure events, EXBD, damage modes, D, and associated failure 
scenarios, F or F̅, must be considered in order to achieve a concise measure of risk to the 
system and thus be able to allocate resources for risk reduction. The risk of an exposure event 
is equal to the consequence associated with that event multiplied by the probability of 
occurrence. In this way the total direct and indirect risks for a set of event exposures (i.e. 
hazard scenario) and possible damage states can be calculated according to the following 
formulas (Champris 2008): 
( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ⋅⋅=
i j
iBDiBDjjDirDir EXPEXDPDCR ..|  (5.5a) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ⋅⋅⋅=
i j
iBDiBDjjIndInd EXPEXDPDFPFCR ..||  (5.5b) 
where the probability of failure for a given damage is assumed conditionally independent of 
the exposure causing it. 
An index of robustness is formulated which is defined as the ratio of direct risk to the 
structural system to the total risk: 
IndDir
Dir
total
Dir
Rob RR
R
R
RI +==  (5.6) 
The robustness index from the above equation can then only give values ranging from zero to 
one. In which a completely robust structure is defined for the case in which there are no 
indirect risks (IRob = 1). While a completely non robust structure would have a robustness 
index of IRob = 0 (Baker et al. 2006). 
The aforementioned assessment of robustness was then further developed by incorporating 
decision analysis theory. This is more representative of actual engineered systems which are 
subject to actions taken by those responsible for its design, maintenance, inspection, etc. The 
event tree from figure 5.2 can then be broadened to include system choices and possible post-
damage exposures. The details of this framework of robustness assessment and corresponding 
robustness index will not be discussed here (read Baker et al. 2006).  
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5.3 Strategies towards greater Robustness of Bridges 
There currently exist various strategies to help prevent disproportionate failure of structures 
which differ in their aptness in application directly for bridge structures. In comparison to 
building structures, bridges are primarily horizontally aligned structures with one main axis of 
extension (Starossek 2009). Their failure mechanism differs from that of buildings and while 
buildings exhibit some inherent redundancies a bridge system is usually composed of 
elements all of which are intended for structural usage; i.e. their combined structural 
resistances comprise the total resistance of the structural system in its entirety. 
Current strategies towards increasing the robustness of bridges structures can be divided into 
the following categories (Starossek 2009): 
‐ Prevent local failure of critical elements; first line of defense 
 Control local resistance 
 Protective measures 
‐ Assume local failure; second line of defense 
 Alternative load paths 
 Isolation by segmentation 
‐ Prescriptive design rules 
These different methods may vary in their suitability for different bridge structures. This has 
much to do with the robustness requirements designated for the bridge structure in question. 
In some cases there may be an acceptable degree of collapse while in others the maintained 
structural integrity of the bridge is paramount. These robustness requirements must therefore 
be prescribed in the design specifications for the bridge with adequate justification. 
5.3.1 Prevent local failure of critical elements: first line of defense 
One direct approach to help prevent disproportionate collapse of bridges structures is to 
prevent the local failure of critical elements; also known as the first line of defense strategy. A 
critical element is a structural component that produces an unacceptably large failure 
progression in the structural system (i.e. degree of progressive collapse). Critical elements 
may be identified through intuitive or analytical procedures; for example, by checking extent 
of collapse progression for a removed structural component. To help increase the robustness 
of the bridge, the design of the bridge must include measures that hinder the failure of these 
elements specifically. This can be done in two different ways: (1) provide adequate local 
resistance to prevent failure or (2) introduce protective or sacrificial devices. This method is 
also known as the first line of defense. 
Increasing the local resistance of a critical element within the structural bridge system is quite 
straightforward and can be prescribed directly in the design requirements. In cases where 
increased resistance is uneconomical or not possible, non-structural protective measures can 
be used. These measures could include physical barriers, surveillance systems, etc. However, 
both of these strategies require that the extraordinary exposure events be identified in which 
case unanticipated hazard scenarios may be overlooked; i.e. the level of safety desired may 
not be as high as required in light of unknown future actions (Starossek 2009). 
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The effectiveness of this method varies from bridge to bridge. In some cases the first line of 
defense strategy may be ineffective (or uneconomical) and other measures to increase 
robustness need to be considered; for example, if the bridge is highly exposed or the number 
of critical elements is high. 
5.3.2 Assume local failure: Second line of defense 
If prevention of local failure of critical elements of a bridge structure cannot be achieved – 
which in actuality can never be absolutely achieved – the only compromise is to account for 
localized failure and implement measures to help minimize the overall consequences such that 
structural robustness is increased.  This method of increasing robustness is favorable for 
highly exposed or very significant bridges, where the consequences of collapse are great 
(Starossek 2006). This would include long span bridges where user safety is imperative (of 
greater consequence) or where the transport network is heavily reliant on the bridge; for 
example, the Öresund bridge between Sweden and Denmark. 
This method of assuming local failure can be advantages in that it is independent of the 
hazard scenario causing the damage. It analyzes the consequence of assumed local failure of 
critical elements. The acceptable extent of local failure should be prescribed in the design 
objectives. 
5.3.2.1 Multiple load paths or redundancy 
In a situation where the structural integrity of a bridge structure is heavily reliant on a single 
critical component, the assumable failure of such a component may be hard to overcome for 
the residual structural capacity of the remaining structure. It is therefore helpful to “share” the 
load via utilizing several different load paths and thereby creating some redundancy in the 
structural system. By this it is meant that various load paths are utilized initially in which the 
structural forces are channeled through all of them (Knoll et al. 2009). Thus if one path were 
to fail or malfunction, the rest may be able to continue resisting the loads; i.e. residual 
capacity remains greater than residual loading after a damaging event. 
The ability of a bridge structure to mobilize multiple load paths relies heavily on the bridge 
systems’ sub-components collective structural behavior to external perturbations. In the case 
where a critical element is removed, the remaining structural components must have enough 
residual capacity to resist the residual loading demands. It is also important to analyze the 
mechanism of failure for the impaired structure to ensure that the transference of loading from 
the knocked-out member to the remaining structure is achievable. In cases where an 
acceptable degree of damage progression is prescribed, it is important for the remaining 
system to adopt the structural functions of all failed elements and maintain overall structural 
stability (at least for a limited period of time to ensure user safety or implement reparative 
measures). 
The existence of multiple loading paths in an engineered structural system shall be referred to 
as redundancy (Starossek 2009). This could include the modification of a structural system 
such that a number of elements share the loading or the strengthening of a member for the 
purpose of creating a resilient alternative load path in case of the failure of an adjoining 
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member. For example, if the support for a bridge system were to fail, the bridge deck could be 
designed with the strength required to resist the residual loading demand for the impaired 
bridge system. 
Catenary action in the bridge 
An example of a specific alternative loading path for bridge structures is the element of 
catenary action in the horizontally aligned structural components of the bridge structure. The 
word catenary is a mathematical term used to describe the curve of a hanging cable or chain 
under the load of gravity and with the effects of tensioning at its supports. Catenary action is 
an engineering term that takes into account the redistribution of loads of beams and plates 
with large deformations; the structural element acts like a catenary cable. Consider a 
horizontally aligned structural component that deforms to such an extent under vertical 
loading that the distribution of internal forces changes from being mostly flexural to tensile 
forces, this is known as catenary action. 
Design codes set limits for loading of structural components in order to limit deflections and 
internal forces. A prerequisite for catenary action of beams or plates is that these limits are 
exceeded. For example, if a steel beam is exposed to high temperatures and deforms to a 
degree that is “hangs” and the vertical loading is mostly distributed as tensile forces in the 
beams cross section. The beams flexural capacity was decreased as a result of the high 
temperatures allowing the beam to deflect to such an extent that catenary behavior was 
initiated. Thus even though the acceptable limit for loading of a beam or plate is exceeded, i.e. 
flexural resistance is exceeded, the initiation of catenary action may be helpful in preventing 
total failure and in that way helps to increase the robustness of the structure. 
An example for the mechanism of catenary action for a simply supported beam is shown in 
figure 5.3 a. The corresponding force-displacement (alt. stress-strain) diagram is shown in 
figure 5.3 b. This type of behavior may also be achieved for a frame bridge in which one or 
more of the supporting pylons are removed.  
 
 
Figure 5.3 a) Catenary action in beam & b) force-displacement relation for catenary action in beam 
 
a) 
b) 
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5.3.2.2 Knock-out scenario 
The knock-out scenario accounts for the accidental removal of a structural element. Measures 
are then implemented to limit the overall consequences of a knocked-out element to the 
bridge system. This is not that dissimilar to creating redundancy in the structure to ensure 
transference of loading and system survival. However, the knock-out scenario may include 
the purposeful design of a member such that for loading above a certain limit, failure is 
ensured without unwanted transference of any additional loading to adjoining structural 
components (Knoll et al. 2009). This means that a certain structural element is “sacrificed” to 
ensure the structural integrity of the remaining structure. For example, if a vehicle were to 
collide with a supporting member of a bridge, it may be better for the support to be knocked-
out such that the impact load does not transfer to the bridge deck itself which may not be 
resilient enough to withstand the resulting dynamic forces. This strategy of robustness is also 
quite relevant for structures with risk of explosion in which certain elements are designed 
such that they are sacrificed in order to protect the rest of the system. 
5.3.2.3 Segmentation 
In the case of bridge structures where the contribution of alternate load paths reach their limit 
in increasing structural robustness other measures must be considered. This was the case for 
the Confederation Bridge in Canada, a 12.9 km long prestressed concrete frame bridge 
structure with 43 continuous 250m spans. Assuming that one of the pylons were to fail, the 
bridge deck itself would have to be design to withstand residual loading for a span of 500m 
which is arguable a futile endeavor (Starossek 2009). Instead the bridge was designed such 
that the removal of one of its pylons would only result in limited failure progression by 
isolating collapsed sections. An acceptable degree of localized collapse was decided upon in 
the design criteria and the bridge design was altered with this in mind. Figure 5.4 shows the 
location of the collapse boundaries (between pier D and hinge H1) for two possible failure 
scenarios (loss of pier C or B). Hinges were placed along the spans to ensure that, for all 
failure modes considered, that the bridge would not progressively collapse beyond these 
boundaries (Starossek 2009). 
 
Figure 5.4 Confederation Bridge, principle sketch for mechanism of “controlled” collapse via segmentation (Starossek 
2009) 
The compartmentalization (or segmentation) of bridge structures such that collapse is 
localized to an acceptable degree (prescribed in the design criteria) can be an effective 
alternative to the robustness strategies previously discussed. For such a strategy to be 
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implemented, the remaining structure must be closely analyzed for loads resulting from the 
localized collapse. It must be ensured that the collapse remains localized and does not 
propagate any further. The mechanism of relevant failure modes must be investigated and the 
resulting mechanisms of collapse analyzed to ensure segmentation is effective (Starossek 
2009). 
This method of ensuring structural robustness of bridges is analogous to controlled demolition 
in that the collapse progression is controlled and localized to only a portion of the structure. 
The suitability of segmentation versus multiple load paths or first line of defense depends on 
the bridge structure being analyzed. It is therefore important to prescribe design criteria which 
include robustness requirement of the structure; i.e. is limited collapse acceptable and to what 
degree, etc. 
5.3.3 Prescriptive design rules 
Thus far the previous strategies of increasing robustness of bridge structures involve direct 
approaches which require complex analysis of the structural response of a bridge system to 
hazard scenarios. These procedures are quite tedious and time consuming and may require 
much computational power. Utilizing this type of analysis for smaller bridge structure may be 
asking too much. The use of prescriptive design rule which are included in structural codes 
(eg. Eurocode 0, refer to section 2.4.2) may instead be adopted. The most common rules are 
the following (Starossek 2006): 
• Tying structural elements together 
• Enabling catenary action 
• Providing ductility 
These rules help to ensure overall structural integrity of bridge systems but should be applied 
with discretion and not be considered the end-all requirement to ensure robustness. Since 
empirical knowledge of collapse progression of bridges is limited (i.e. due to the rarity of the 
event) there is still much to be learned with regard to robustness promoting features and their 
effectiveness. Every bridge should therefore be carefully examined in an effort to extrapolate 
which method of robust design should be implemented and whether detailed analysis is 
required or if prescriptive design requirements are adequate. 
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6. Robustness considerations of Sjölundaviadukten Bridge 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous sections of the report gave an overview of structural robustness as a property of 
bridge structures including a discussion of its application in the design of bridges. Various 
methods of quantifying robustness have been mentioned as well as strategies aimed at 
increasing overall structural robustness for bridge structures. Thus far the concept of 
structural robustness has been examined in a relatively wide context without going into much 
detail with regard to its application for specific bridge structures. The best way in achieving a 
better understanding of structural robustness as a property of bridge structures is to conduct a 
case study thereby incorporating the points of discussion from the previous section of this 
report. 
This section of the report considers a post-tensioned reinforced concrete road bridge, the 
Sjölundaviadadukt Bridge in Malmö, Sweden, with regard to its structural robustness. The 
purpose of this examination is to attempt at a framework for the analysis of structural 
robustness for an arbitrary bridge structure. The focus of this study is of the methodology for 
structural robustness considerations rather than of the specific analytical procedures. 
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6.2 Background 
The Sjölundaviadukt Bridge is a post-tensioned reinforced concrete road bridge with 5 spans 
for a total length of around 190m. The bridge is currently under construction and is being 
built to replace an older bridge which can be seen on figure 6.1; it is expected to be completed 
in the spring of 2010. The original bridge was first completed in 1931 and later in 1968. The 
original design was deemed inadequate to support the amount and size of heavy traffic it is 
currently exposed to and there was a risk that it might fail as a result of this [4].  
 
Figure 6.1 Aerial photo of old Sjölundaviadukt Bridge in Malmö [5] 
 
The bridge deck consists of a double lane road [K 4.975] including adjacent walkways and 
cycle lanes [G 1.625 C 2.0] on either side for a total deck breadth of around 20m. The traffic 
running under the bridge consists of 16 railroad tracks for goods and commuter train traffic as 
well as a 4 lane road highway. The substructure consists of 4 pylons and 2 abutments made 
from reinforced concrete. Traffic information for the surrounding infrastructure elements 
including road and railway arteries is given in section 6.3.1. 
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Figure 6.2 Webcam snapshot of Sjölundaviadukt during construction, seen at the top right (09-11-10 [6]) 
6.3 Structural system 
The Sjölundaviadukt Bridge structural system can be defined as for an arbitrary multi-span 
bridge system given by figure 2.2 in section 2.5. The main structural system is the bridge 
structure itself which is coupled to the super-system comprised of the surrounding 
infrastructure elements; i.e. the railroad tracks, roads and cycle/pedestrian paths. The bridge 
system can be hierarchically divided as shown in figure 6.3. The structural system can be 
categorized into two sub-systems which are the super-structure comprised of the bridge deck 
and its sub-systems and the sub-structure comprised of bridge supports, foundations, etc. 
The hierarchical division shown in figure 6.3 does not include the coupling attributes between 
each sub-system/element which is important when considering the propagation of damage 
within the system given failure of one or more sub-system elements. A graphical 
representation of how the elements are connected is shown in figure 6.4.  From figure 6.4 it 
becomes easier to determine the different mechanisms of failure and identify critical elements. 
In the event of structural failure of one of the key elements of the bridge, such as one of the 
supporting members, it is important to identify the topology of collapse; for example, failure 
of support # 2 may lead to the failure of spans 1-2 and 2-3 and so on. 
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Other important characteristics of the bridge system are the properties attributed to its 
constituent elements such as material and geometric features. This includes the concrete 
quality of various elements, the steel reinforcement, post-tensioning cables, bearing systems 
etc. However, the characteristics of the external and internal perturbations (i.e. different types 
of loading and internal flaws) are also significant in that they can directly affect the attributes 
of the structural elements. By this it is meant that the probability of failure of a structural 
member is largely dependent on its actual internal circumstance (i.e. is it flawed in some way) 
as well as the relevant external perturbations to which it is exposed. It is, however, more 
difficult to graphically interpret these circumstances in a concise manner but one may refer to 
section 3 for reference. 
 
Figure 6.4 Graphical representation of couplings/interrelations between elements in Sjölundaviadukt Bridge 
The intended function of the bridge system in this case is to maintain the flow of traffic which 
is a direct attribute of the infrastructure network super-system; i.e. road, pedestrian and cycle 
traffic on the bridge deck itself as well as train and vehicle traffic underneath the bridge. 
Another inherent function of the bridge system is to provide a safe environment for its users 
including rail guards to prevent vehicles from leaving the bridge deck in the event of a traffic 
accident. It will be prescribed that the failure of two or more of the span sections of the bridge 
deck constitutes a global failure of the structural system; this can be justified for a relatively 
small multi-span bridge such as the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge. Furthermore, the failure of a 
span section would also retard traffic both under the bridge as well as over it which is a direct 
consequence to the surrounding infrastructure elements. 
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6.3.1 Specifications/assumptions 
This section lists the specifications/assumptions required for the robustness analysis of the 
Sjölundaviadukt Bridge including surrounding infrastructure objects. Refer to figure 6.5 for 
layout of the bridge. 
6.3.1.1 Bridge Structure 
The bridge structure itself is composed of reinforced concrete with post-tensioning tendons in 
the bridge deck. The following specifications were acquired from the engineering firm 
Centerlof & Holmberg AB located in Malmö. 
• Concrete class: C35/45 (primary structure) 
• Reinforcement: Ks60S (primary) 
• Concrete cover: 
¾ 100mm (bottom reinforcement of bridge deck) 
¾ 45mm + 10mm (construction specs) 
• Cable system:  
¾ fyk/fuk = 1550/1770 MPa 
¾ Area of tendon: Asp = 1800 mm2 
• Bearing system: Pot bearings5 - 3 types used 
¾ Fixed pot bearings 
‐ Maximum horizontal load: 1600 kN / bearing 
¾ Unidirectional pot bearings 
‐ Maximum horizontal load: 14106 (12107) kN / bearing 
‐ +/-100mm movement capacity along primary bridge axis 
¾ Multidirectional pot bearings 
‐ +/-100mm movement capacity along primary bridge axis 
‐ +/-50mm movement capacity along transverse axis 
• Internal supports 
¾ Support no. 2 
‐ 2 multidirectional bearings 
‐ 2 unidirectional bearing (movement parallel to bridge axis) 
¾ Support no. 3 
‐ 2 fixed bearings 
‐ 2 unidirectional bearings (movement transverse to bridge axis) 
¾ Support no. 4 
‐ 2 multidirectional bearings 
‐ 2 unidirectional bearing (movement parallel to bridge axis) 
                                                 
5 Pot bearings are shaped as a cylinder/pot with a piston. Between the cylinder and piston is a temperature 
resistant rubber element which is completely sealed-in allowing rotational motion between the bearing parts. 
Moveable pot bearings consist of a sliding layer between the upper and lower structure consisting of a PTFE 
sliding plate with a movement capacity of +/- 50mm or +/- 100mm. Given values are for TOBE® FR4 Pot 
bearing (Product distributer in Sweden: Spännteknik SLF AB; www.spannteknik.se). 
6 For support no. 2 
7 For support no. 4 
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6.3.1.2 Road traffic 
• Road traffic on bridge deck road8: 
¾ 8400 standard road vehicles / day 
¾ 1100 heavy traffic vehicles / day 
• Speed limit for traffic on bridge deck: 
¾ 50 km/h (after completion) 
• Road traffic under bridge [7]: 
¾ ~40 000 vehicles / day 
• Speed limit for traffic under bridge:  
¾ 90 km/h (after completion) 
¾ 70 / 50 km/h (during construction) 
6.3.1.3 Rail tracks & railway traffic 
• Rail class A - welded track with concrete sleepers (assumed) 
• Rail track use 
¾ GBG01-GBG10 (Godsbangård): Goods trains 
¾ SP61-SP64 (Södra stambanan): Passanger trains 
¾ MSP59 (Godspassagespåret): Goods trains 
¾ SP50: Track to RailCombi 
• Railway traffic passing under bridge (Grimm et al. 2009) 
¾ Passenger trains:  155 trains / day  => 56 575 trains / year in one direction 
‐ Assumed for tracks SP61-SP64 
¾ Goods trains:  47 trains / day   => 17 155 trains / year in one direction 
‐ Assumed for tracks GBG01-GBG10 & MSP59 
• Speed limit near bridge 
¾ SP50:  30 km/h 
¾ GBG01-GBG10: 40 km/h 
¾ MSP59: 70 km/h 
¾ SP61-SP64: 160 km/h 
• Weight of train car* 
¾ Passenger train: 70 tonnes (assumed mean value) 
¾ Goods train:  100 tonnes (assumed mean value) 
• Number of axles per train type* 
¾ Passenger train:  2 (assumed mean value) 
¾ Goods train:  4 (assumed mean value) 
• Number of cars per train type* 
¾ Passenger train:  3 (assumed mean value) 
¾ Goods train:  10 (assumed mean value) 
* The mean values are assumed with basis on previous research done by Östlund et al. (1995) 
and Sparre (1995). 
                                                 
8 According to traffic measurements Dec. 2006 [4]  
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6.4 Hazard scenarios 
As with any structural bridge system the relevant hazard scenarios underestimated, 
overlooked or neglected during the design process must be examined with regard to the 
structural robustness of the system. Unforeseen hazards are by definition, however, hard to 
identify and quantify. An attempt may be made following the division given in section 3 in 
which internal and external perturbations could be considered. 
For the sake of simplification it is assumed that the bridge is constructed as designed and that 
gross internal flaws during design, construction and operation may be neglected. Furthermore 
it is assumed that no extraordinary exposures occur during the construction of the bridge 
system. That leaves the external perturbations to be considered for the completed bridge 
structure. These may be divided as shown in section 3.3: 
¾ Overloading 
‐ The case of overloading for the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge will be omitted for this 
analysis. It seems highly unlikely that at any one time the bridge will contain 
enough heavy traffic simultaneously to exceed the load carrying capacity of the 
bridge system. 
¾ Accidents 
‐ The accidental loading hazard scenario seems more likely in this case in which 
traffic collisions to one of the supports from either trains or cars underneath the 
bridge may cause disproportionate collapse. Traffic on the superstructure (i.e. 
the road traffic on the bridge itself), however, is much less significant in that 
the primary structural members for the bridge system are part of the 
substructure of the bridge according to the hierarchical structural division 
shown in figure 6.3. 
¾ Fatigue/deterioration 
‐ It may be assumed that over time the effects of fatigue and deterioration could 
significantly alter the robustness of the bridge, however, a thorough and 
periodic inspection and maintenance of the structure should aid in eliminating 
any extreme deviations from occurring. 
¾ Malevolence (purposeful destruction) 
‐ In the case of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge the primary structural members are 
easy to identify. The purposeful destruction of one or more of these members 
should be taken into consideration. This may be done through analysis of the 
consequences of removal of one of these members including dynamic effects 
of explosions, etc, to the system as a whole. 
¾ Natural events 
‐ This hazard scenario is much harder to identify. Extreme natural events are 
very unlikely to occur in the region of the bridge and events such as 
earthquakes may be neglected altogether. It is also unlikely that flooding 
would occur although in such a case the surrounding infrastructure networks 
would be directly affected in any case and the survival of the bridge structure 
itself becomes second to the safety of its users. 
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In the case of the Sjölundaviadukt the obvious extraordinary exposures include those 
originating within the super-system; in this case the railway tracks and roads in the 
surrounding environment. These hazard scenarios are included within the accidental loading 
set described above. From observation of the layout of the bridge it is determined that the 
critical elements include the supports for the bridge structure and their failure may lead to 
indirect consequences for the bridge system as a whole. Thus accidental situations including 
train or vehicle collisions to one of the bridge supports should be considered. In this paper the 
former case will be more closely analyzed. 
It is important to note that the results obtained from a robustness analysis of a single exposure 
type do not conclusively determine whether or not the structure is sufficiently robust. It does, 
however, aid in determining the structural system’s ability to withstand possible failure of one 
element; i.e. if a critical member (pylon in this case) fails, how will the system react. 
In the case of train derailment and subsequent pylon collision an event tree may be formulated 
based on Baker et al. (2006), refer to figure 6.6. The direct and indirect risks associated with 
this exposure could be obtained using equations (5.5a) and (5.5b) and an index of robustness 
evaluated using equation (5.6). The focus of this case study will, however, be on the 
probabilities associated with the collapse equation given in equation (3.1). The consequences 
associated with pylon collision as a result of train derailment (i.e. CDir and CInd) will not be 
quantified. 
 
Figure 6.6 Event tree for train collision with bridge support as a result of derailment 
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6.5 Method of analysis 
The probability of train derailment, its impact on the bridge supports given collision and the 
resulting structural consequences to the bridge system as a whole will be examined. A 
probabilistic method of analysis will be used. The focus of the robustness analysis will be of 
the probabilities associated with the collapse of the bridge structure. 
The event tree shown in figure 6.6 forms the basis for the analysis which will be done. The 
event exposure being investigated is pylon collision due to derailment of a train towards a 
supporting member of the bridge deck. This is only one of a variety of exposures which can 
be accounted for; others may include car/truck collision, explosions, sabotage, etc. The 
probability associated with the event will be determined and the effect to the support in 
question analyzed. Finally any indirect effects to the entire structural system can be 
determined; i.e. will the system fail and to what degree? This does not, however, include any 
quantification of the consequences to the system, direct or indirect, which would be required 
in order to calculate an index of robustness according to Baker et al. (2006); see equations 
(5.5a), (5.5b) and (5.6). 
Figure 6. shows a flow chart for the procedure which will be utilized for the robustness 
analysis of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge. 
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Figure 6.7 Flow chart: method of robustness assessment for Sjölundaviadukt Bridge (considerations of pylon collision 
as a result of train derailment) 
 
Identify Hazard 
Scenario
Choose support to 
be analyzed
Calculate probability of 
exposure event occuring
(section 6.6.1)
Calculate probability of 
damage to support
(section 6.6.2)
Calculate probability of 
system failure
(section 6.6.3)
Have all 
supports 
been 
checked?
Pylon collision as a result 
of train derailment towards 
support
Support no. i
NO
Calculate total 
probability of collapse
(section 6.6.4)
YES
6.6
The lay
and road
supporti
adjacen
the Sjöl
Figure
The exa
probabi
a suppo
support 
failure o
 
 
 
 Pylon
out of the 
s. In the ev
ng elemen
t; in this ca
undaviaduk
 6.8 Schematic
mination o
lities associ
rt and in th
can be det
f the pylon
 collisio
proposed b
ent of train
ts are those
se supports
t Bridge an
 illustration o
f pylon col
ated with tr
e direction 
ermined an
, the behav
n due to
ridge is sh
 derailmen
 along the
 no. 2, 3 an
d surround
f the Sjölunda
lision as a 
ain derailm
of that supp
d compared
ior of the re
43 
 train de
own in figu
t and subse
 inner span
d 4. Refer t
ing environ
viadukt Bridg
shown) 
result of tr
ent in the 
ort. Once t
 with the r
maining br
railmen
re 6.8 incl
quent pylo
 of the bri
o figure 6.
ment.  
e and surroun
ain derailm
area near th
his is done,
esistance o
idge structu
t 
uding adjac
n collision 
dge with t
5 for a mor
ding environm
ent starts w
e bridge, o
 the impact
f the pylon
re can be a
ent railroa
the obvious
rain tracks 
e detailed l
ent (the old b
ith a chec
n tracks adj
 force to th
. Finally, g
nalyzed.  
d tracks 
 critical 
running 
ayout of 
 
ridge is 
k of the 
acent to 
e bridge 
iven the 
44 
The following cases will be checked: 
CASE 1:  Collision as a result of derailment of goods train from track GBG06 or GBG07 
towards support no. 2 
CASE 2a: Collision as a result of derailment of goods train from track MSP59 towards 
support no. 3 
CASE 2b: Collision as a result of derailment of passenger train from track SPS61 towards 
support no. 3 
CASE 3: Collision as a result of derailment of passenger train from track SPS64 towards 
support no. 4 
The total probability of collapse as a result of train collision due to train derailment can then 
be evaluated (refer to equation 3.1): 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑ ⋅⋅∩= iijij EPEDPEDFPtrainderailedfromcollisioncollapseP |||  (6.1) 
( )iEP   - probability of a train derailing towards a support i of the bridge, Ei. The 
subscript i refers the case which is being analyzed;  i.e. derailment towards 
which support. ( )ij EDP |   - probability of local damage (mode j) to the support given exposure Ei ( )ij EDFP ∩|   - probability of global collapse given local damage Dj due to exposure E 
 
Table 6.1 shows the geometric variables for supports no. 2, 3 and 4 including the 
perpendicular distances between the supports and two adjacent rail tracks, yobs, their length, 
Lobs, and breadth, bobs. (Refer to figure 6.8) 
Table 6.1 Geometric variables associated with supports no. 2, 3 and 4 
 
The shortest distance between pylon and track is 3 m for support no. 2 which is significantly 
smaller than for any other support. However, the train speed limit is significantly less for 
tracks adjacent to support no. 2 than for support no. 3 or 4. It is unclear which case is more 
significant at this point. A graphical representation of the expected damage progression 
described in the previous section for support no. 2 is shown in figure 6.9 as an example. 
Analogous figures can be made for supports no. 3 and 4. 
Support 
no.
Length Breadth
Wall 
heigth
y obs  [m] track no. y obs [m] track no. L [m] b  [m] H [m]
2 3 GBG06 3 GBG07 11,65 0,75 7,53
3 6,7 MSP59 8,5 SP61 11,65 0,9 7,63
4 8,4 SP64 ‐ ‐ 11,65 0,9 6,76
Perp. distance: support to railway track
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6.6.1 Probability of train derailment in direction towards support 
The probability of a train leaving the tracks in a direction towards a support of the bridge 
structure can be determined with the aid of probabilistic derailment models developed by 
Banverket (Swedish National Railway Authority) (Fredén 2001). The total probability that a 
train derails towards one of the supporting members of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge is given 
by the following equation: 
( ) ( ) 3210 PPPPpportsutowardsderailmentPEP ⋅⋅⋅==  (6.2)  
where: 
P0 is the probability of a train derailing in the region near the bridge (arbitrary track 
length equal to 1 km) 
P1 is the probability, given derailment, that a train will derail on tracks adjacent to 
the support being analyzed 
P2 is the probability, given derailment of a train on tracks adjacent to the support 
being analyzed, that a train will derail in the direction of the support 
P3 is the probability, given derailment of a train on tracks adjacent to the support in 
the direction of the support, that a train will derail within the critical region of 
collision (see following sections) 
Figure 6.10 shows a schematic representation of these probabilities. 
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Figure 6.10 Schematic representation for the calculation of train derailment towards a bridge pylon 
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The first probability term, P0 and the fourth probability term, P3, must be more closely 
analyzed. The probability of derailment, P0, can be acquired using calculation models from 
Banverket (Fredén 2001). The critical region of pylon collision depends on the mechanics of 
derailment and determines the fourth probability term, P3. 
The critical region for pylon collision is defined as the length of track for which, if derailment 
were to occur, collision is possible. The critical length, xcrit, for an arbitrary derailed train is 
shown in figure 6.11. 
 
Figure 6.11 Critical region of derailment with regard to train collision with obstruction 
It is assumed that a limiting derailment angle exists for which train derailment does not pose a 
threat for pylon collision. Analogously, a maximum derailment angle is assumed. The 
minimum derailment angle, θmin, is determined from the maximum stopping distance for a 
derailed train towards an obstruction alongside the rail tracks while the maximum derailment 
angle, θmax, is determined for a given speed in which toppling (i.e. rolling over during 
derailment) of the train is possible. The critical length is then determined from the following 
formula: 
( ) ( )maxmin tantan θθ
obsobsobs
obscrit
ybyLx −++=  (6.3) 
Although complex calculation models may be formulated to examine the mechanism of train 
derailment (see Brabie 2007) they are quite cumbersome and require a significant amount of 
input data and complex calculation to apply. Furthermore, many of these models seem rather 
to focus on methods of preventing derailment rather than on post-derailment behavior and its 
consequences. Thus a simplified method will be adopted based on Östlund et al (1995). Refer 
to appendix A for a summary of their findings including calculations of the critical lengths 
given by equation (6.3). 
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The following formulas were determined for the minimum and maximum derailment angles 
(see appendix A): 
m
radCwhere
v
C sec.5,3,
0
max =≈θ  (6.4) 
2
0
1
min
2sin
v
gyobs ⋅⋅= − ηθ  (6.5) 
where  
C is a constant used to determine the maximum derailment angle, θmax 
v0 is the initial velocity of the train as it derails 
η is the friction coefficient of the surrounding soil 
g is the acceleration due to gravity = 9,8 m/s2 
Table 6.2 shows the values for the minimum and maximum derailment angles and critical 
length of derailment for supports no. 2, 3 and 4. Refer to figure 6.5 and figure 6.8 for a layout 
of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge and surrounding railroad tracks. 
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Table 6.2 θmax, θmin, and xcrit for supports no. 2, 3 and 4 
 
Probability of derailment, P0 
The probability of derailment in general can be obtained by using Banverket’s model for 
probability calculation of train accidents (sv. Modell för skattning av sannolikheten för 
järnvägsoluckor som drabbar omgivningen) by Fredén 2001. This model is based on 
statistical analysis of train accidents in Sweden between 1981 and 1995. The official 
definition for what could be considered a train accident was limited to a cost consequence of 
10.000 SEK by SJ until 1994 when it was increased to 100.000 SEK. This means that the 
number of registered train accidents thereafter decreased drastically and the use of accidental 
data onwards from 1995 is therefore not suitable to be used for train accident analysis (Fredén 
2001). Thus, in the absence of more detailed statistical data of more recent train accidents and 
for the purposes of simplification, the probability model developed by Fredén in 2001 for the 
Banverket will be used to obtain the probability of derailment. The calculation model is 
discussed in appendix B. 
Basic Variable Symbol Distribution Dimension Parameters Mean
Standard 
deviation
Coeff. of 
variation
Derailment for 
track no.
[Dist] X i ϵ Dist.(m,s) μ X σX V X
Constant to find  θ max C Lognormal rad sec / m C  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 3,5 1,75 0,5 ‐
Friction of surface η Lognormal ‐ η ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 0,5 0,25 0,5 ‐
Length of support L obs Determin. m - 11,65 ‐ ‐ ‐
Breadth of support b obs Determin. m ‐ 0,75 ‐ ‐ ‐
3,0 GBG07
3,0 GBG06
11,1 1,1 0,1 GBG07
11,1 1,1 0,1 GBG06
18,2 9,3 0,51 GBG07
18,2 9,3 0,51 GBG06
14,1 7,7 0,55 GBG07
14,1 7,7 0,55 GBG06
17,5 9,7 0,55 GBG07
17,5 9,7 0,55 GBG06
Breadth of support b obs Determin. m ‐ 0,9 ‐ ‐ ‐
6,7 MSP59
8,5 SP61
19,4 1,9 0,1 MSP59
44,4 4,4 0,1 SP61
10,4 5,3 0,51 MSP59
4,6 2,3 0,51 SP61
10,3 5,6 0,55 MSP59
2,5 1,4 0,55 SP61
17,3 30,0 1,74 MSP59
121,1 130,7 1,08 SP61
Breadth of support b obs Determin. m ‐ 0,9 ‐ ‐ ‐
Perpendicular distance to 
support
y obs Determin. m - 8,4 ‐ ‐ SP64
Derailment velocity v 0 Lognormal m/s v 0  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 44,4 4,4 0,1 SP65
Maximum derailment angle θ max Lognormal ° θ max ϵ LN(λ,ζ) 4,6 2,3 0,51 SP66
Minimum derailment angle θ min Lognormal ° θ min ϵ LN(λ,ζ) 2,5 1,3 0,55 SP67
Critical length of derailment x crit Normal m x crit ϵ LN(λ,ζ) 122,6 130,5 1,06 SP68
Case 4: Collision with support no. 4 from track SP64
Maximum derailment angle θ max Lognormal ° θ max ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
Minimum derailment angle θ min Lognormal ° θ min ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
Critical length of derailment x crit Normal m x crit ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
‐
Derailment velocity v 0 Lognormal m/s v 0  ϵ LN( λ,ζ)
Perpendicular distance to 
support
y obs Determin. m - ‐
θ max Lognormal ° θ max ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
Critical length of derailment x crit Normal m x crit ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
Minimum derailment angle θ min Lognormal ° θ min ϵ LN(λ,ζ)
CASE 1: Collision with support no. 2 from tracks GBG06 or GBG07
CASE 2a & 2b: Collision with support no. 3 from tracks MSP59 or SP61
Universal variables (i.e. same for all supports)
Perpendicular distance to 
support
y obs Determin. m - ‐ ‐
Derailment velocity v 0 Lognormal m/s v 0  ϵ LN( λ,ζ)
Maximum derailment angle
51 
Probability of derailment on tracks near to support, P1 
The probability of derailment on tracks adjacent to a support can easily be determined. It is 
the ratio of adjacent tracks to the total number of tracks and the same expression can be used 
for all inner supports, provided that all tracks have the same traffic intensity: 
)(.
.
1 typetraintracksofnototal
tracksadjacentofnoP =  (6.6) 
Probability of derailment in direction of support, P2 
The train may derail in two directions off the track and considering that the track is straight in 
the region being considered: 
5,02 =P    (6.7) 
Probability of derailment within critical region of pylon collision, P3 
The probability of derailment within the critical region of pylon collision is determined from 
the following expression: 
kmkm
xP critxcrit
113
μ≈=   (6.8) 
Although the critical region determined from eq. (6.3) is a random variable (refer to table 4.1 
and appendix A), the mean value will be used for simplification; i.e. xcrit will be treated as a 
deterministic variable, for the purposes of determining P3. 
Results: Probability of train derailing towards support 
Now that all probability terms from equation (6.2) have been determined, the total probability 
of a train derailing towards supports no. 2, 3 and 4 of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge can be 
evaluated. Table 6.3 shows the calculated probabilities associated with each of these supports 
and the total probability which is calculated using equation (6.2). 
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53 
6.6.2 Direct consequences of pylon collision 
The behavior of a derailed train has been discussed as well as the probability of such an event 
occurring. The next step is then to analyze the direct structural consequences of a train 
colliding with a bridge support; i.e. how will the pylon be directly affected. This entails 
determining a collision force to the pylon (refer to appendix A) as well as checking the 
resistance of the support for different failure modes. 
6.6.2.1 Action effect – force from collision 
The calculation of the force at impact for a derailed train may be obtained using complex 
crash mechanics. However, these calculations are quite complex and will not be used for the 
purposes of this paper*. Instead a simplified model based on traditional physical relations will 
be adopted. Refer to appendix A for calculations relevant to the derailment model which is to 
be used. 
* The focus of this paper is on creating a framework for the assessment of robustness of bridges rather than on 
the specific methods of analysis. It must be noted, however, that in the case of a more thorough structural 
robustness case study, more complex analytical procedures may be required. 
Force at impact, Fimp 
The force at impact, Fimp, for a derailed train when it collides with a bridge pylon is dependent 
on the train’s velocity at impact (refer to appendix A). Two simplified methods for 
determining this force will be considered based on (1) impulse momentum equilibrium 
(equation (6.9a)) and (2) energy equilibrium (equation (6.9b)). 
t
vm
F impimp Δ
⋅=  (6.9a) 
Δt – impulse time during collision. 
s
vm
F impimp Δ⋅
⋅=
2
2
 (6.9b)
 
 
Δs –  the distance in which the center of gravity of the body travels during collision; i.e. the 
“shortening” distance of the train in this case. 
Since neither Δt nor Δs can be explicitly determined, suitable estimations must be made. Both 
variables will be assumed lognormally distributed with the following means and coefficients 
of variation: 
1,05,1 == ΔΔ ss Vmμ
 
(6.10a)
 
1,05,0 == ΔΔ tt Vsμ  (6.10b) 
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Impact velocity, vimp 
The impact velocity of a train derailing towards a bridge support is dependent on the 
derailment velocity (v0), the actual derailment angle (θ), the soil friction properties (η) and 
perpendicular distance of the support from the rail tracks (yobs). The following equation was 
determined in appendix A: 
θη sin2
2
0
obs
imp
ygvv ⋅⋅−=  (6.11) 
Notice that the impact velocity given in equation (6.11) yields either positive or complex 
solutions depending on the sign of the value from within the square root. The latter situation is 
representative of the cases in which a derailed train comes to rest before it has reached the 
support, which is not improbable given a small derailment angle, low derailment velocity or 
large soil friction coefficient. These cases will yield no impact force at all. 
Actual derailment angle, θ 
The limiting derailment angles were determined from equations (6.3) and (6.4) but in order to 
simulate the impact velocity and corresponding impact force, the actual derailment angle must 
be determined. A suitable estimation may be made which states that the train has an equal 
probability of derailing between very small angles (~0 deg) and the maximum derailment 
angle determined from equation (6.4). Thus the actual derailment angle for a derailed train 
will be assumed uniformly distributed between 0 deg. and the maximum derailment angle 
θmax; i.e. the following rectangular distribution is assumed: 
( )max,0 θθ R∈   (6.12) 
NOTE: θ is a uniformly distribution random variable with bounds 0 and θmax ϵ LN* 
* θmax is a lognormally distributed variable (refer to appendix A.2).  
Simulation of impact force 
The impact force from equations (6.9a) and (6.9b) are reliant on random variables and is thus 
itself a random variable. In order to determine the cumulative probability function for Fimp a 
Monte-Carlo simulation will be carried out using MATLAB [A]. Table 6.4 shows all random 
and discrete variables that will be used to determine the impact force Fimp including 
corresponding statistical parameters where relevant. 
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Table 6.4 Basic variables used for calculation of impact force 
 
Now that all parameters required to calculate the impact force have been determined, along 
with their corresponding statistical attributes, the Monte Carlo simulation may be used to 
determine the distribution of Fimp. Figure 6.12 shows the results for 1 000 000 simulations for 
equations (6.9a) and (6.9b) for support no. 2. 
 
 
 
 
Basic Variable Symbol Distribution Dimension Parameters mean
Coeff. of 
variation
[Dist] X i  ϵ Dist.(m,s) μ X V X
Mass of train m Normal tonnes m ϵ N(μ,σ) sec. 6.3.1.1 0,1
Derailment velocity v 0 Lognormal m/s v 0  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) sec. 6.3.1.1 0,1
Actual derailment angle θ Uniform ° θ ϵ R(0,θ max ) varies varies
Maximum derailment angle θ max eq. (6.3) ° θ max = C/v 0 ‐ ‐
Constant to find  θ max C Lognormal rad sec / m C ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 3,5 0,5
Perpendicular distance to 
support
y obs Determin. m - table 6.1 ‐
Shortening  Δs Lognormal m Δs ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 1,5 0,1
Impulse time Δt Lognormal s Δt ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 0,5 0,1
Friction of surface η Lognormal ‐ η ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 0,5 0,5
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Figure 6.12 Impact force for support no. 2 (case 1) 
Notice that there exists a probability of about 53% that for derailment of a train in the 
direction towards support no. 2 the train it will stop before it can cause a collision. It is 
therefore not so simple to attain a valid statistical distribution for the empirical distribution 
shown in figure 6.12 without transforming the empirical distribution. 
Although both curves from figure 6.12 yield similar distributions the curve created using 
equation (6.9b) will be utilized for use in further analysis; i.e. based on “shortening” of train 
during impact (Δs). Figure 6.13 and figure 6.14 show the empirical distribution for the 
perpendicular impact force component (i.e. orthogonal to support wall) for derailed trains 
toward supports no. 3 and 4 using equation (6.9b). 
The next step is to determine the resistance of the support against collision. 
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Figure 6.13 Perpendicular impact force component for collision with support no. 3 from goods trains (case 2a) and 
commuter trains (case 2b) 
 
Figure 6.14 Perpendicular impact force component for collision with support no. 4 from commuter trains (case 3) 
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6.6.2.2 Resistance of support 
In order to extract the probability of failure for the support in the event of a train collision, the 
corresponding resistance to the impact forces found in section 6.6.2.1 must be determined for 
cases 1, 2a, 2b and 3 (refer to section 6.6). Thus the parameters pertaining to the strength, 
material, geometric, etc. properties of the supporting members must be determined along with 
their statistical attributes. However, first the various failure modes pertaining to a collision 
with a pylon of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge must be identified. 
The failure modes for a bridge support in the event of collision from a derailed train are given 
in the following list (refer to figure 6.15): 
1. Shear failure at joint between support wall and foundation footing given rotation about 
bearing connections between bridge and support. 
o Mechanism: Friction capacity at section between wall and foundation 
(including contribution of reinforcement) overcome. It is assumed that the pot 
bearings do not fail; i.e. support wall does not slide from under bridge during 
impact. 
2. Failure of support wall due to combined moment and axial action given that the 
bearing connections between bridge and support do not fail. 
o Mechanism: Combined axial force from bridge deck and moment due to 
impact causes failure of wall (i.e. MN graph). 
3. Failure of support wall with 2 plastic hinges given that the bearing connections 
between bridge and support do not fail. 
o Mechanism: As for 2 but yield moment capacity at connection between wall 
and foundation overcome. 
4. Failure of support wall due to combined moment and axial action given failure of 
bearing connection between support and bridge deck. 
o Mechanism: Failure of bridge bearings and subsequent combined moment and 
axial action at the bottom of the wall. 
5. Sliding of support foundation and rotation about bearing connection between support 
and bridge. 
o Mechanism: Impact force causes foundation to slide; i.e. shear resistance 
between foundation and soil overcome while the bearing connection between 
bridge and support does not fail. 
6. Sliding of support foundation and failure of bearing connection between support and 
bridge deck. 
o Mechanism: Impact force cause foundation to slide and bearing connection 
between bridge and support to fail almost simultaneously.  
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These modes of failure vary in their aptness depending on which support is being checked. 
For pylons with moveable pot bearings failure modes 2 and 3 are not very likely while they 
may occur for pylons with fixed bearings. The first, fifth and sixth mode of failure seems 
unlikely for all pylons. The shear strength of the connection between the pylon and wall is 
significantly higher than the wall cross sections moment capacity about the weaker axis. Also, 
the sliding of the support is not very likely given the area of the footing and the contribution 
of resistance from the soil fill around the support. Table 6.5 shows which failure modes will 
be considered for supports no. 2, 3 and 4. 
 
Figure 6.15 Different failure modes for bridge pylon given collision by a derailed train (My – yield moment capacity, 
Mu – ultimate moment capacity) 
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Table 6.5 Failure modes to be considered for train collision with supports no. 2, 3 and 4 
 
In order to determine the resistances associated with failure modes 3 and 4, the following 
assumption will be made: 
¾ The impact is assumed to act on the center of gravity for the supports cross section and 
any in plane structural effect will be ignored; such as torsion. 
¾ The moment resistance of the wall cross section about the stronger axis is much 
greater than for the weaker axis and the following relationship between these 
resistances for a constant normal force will be considered: 
 
Figure 6.16 Moment relationship for support wall for biaxial bending and constant normal force 
¾ The support will be analyzed as a wall subject to the force component perpendicular to 
the wall axis.  
¾ Failure of the wall is assumed when yielding of the tensile reinforcement occurs. 
¾ Hardening effects to the concrete or reinforcement due to collision will be neglected. 
From figure 6.16 it can be seen that the force component perpendicular to the wall, Fimp.y, is 
decisive when determining whether or not the pylon fails. The corresponding moment from 
this force is determined first for failure mode no. 4: 
aFM impModeSx ⋅⋅= θsin4.  (6.13) 
where a is the vertical distance of the force from the base of the wall. The impact force is 
assumed to act at a distance of 1,5 m from the ground surrounding the support. 
  
Support no. Failure mode Justification
2 no. 4
Multi/Unidirectional bearing between support wall and 
bridge provides little or no horizontal resistance
3 no. 3 or 4
Fixed bearing between support wall and bridge may provide 
some horizontal resistance depending on size and direction 
of impact force
4 no. 4
Multi/Unidirectional bearing between support wall and 
bridge provides little or no horizontal resistance
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The moment diagram for failure mode no. 3 is shown in figure 6.17. There are two moments 
which must be considered: MA – moment at location of impact force and MB – moment at 
connection between the support wall and foundation footing. The superposition method used 
to determine internal forces and deformations of statically indeterminate linear elastic 
structures determines the following (refer to figure 6.17): 
H
aHaFM impP
−⋅⋅⋅= θsin  (6.14a) 
where H is the height of the wall. 
 
Figure 6.17 Method of superposition to determine the moment distribution for failure mode no. 2 
The corresponding resistances to moments MA and MB must be considered for failure mode 
no. 3: MRAx and MRBx. The following condition is obtained:  
PRBxRAx MHaMM ≤⋅+ /  (6.14b) 
Refer to section 6.6.2.3. 
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Figure 6.18 shows the layout of support no. 2 with regard to pylon collision from a derailed 
train. 
 
  
Figure 6.18 Layout for collision with support no. 2 due to train derailment 
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The moment resistance of the support walls for combined uniaxial bending and normal force 
was determined in appendix C. The following formula was determined: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅= xbxLfbdAfM csyRx 4,028,02 α  (6.15) 
where the depth of the neutral axis (i.e. where strain is zero) is determined: 
Lf
AfN
x
c
sy
⋅⋅⋅
⋅+=
8,0α   (6.16) 
N Normal force on wall from self weight loading only, see table 6.6 
fy Yield strength of reinforcing steel, see table 6.7 
fc Compressive strength of concrete, see table 6.7 
α In-situ parameter for compressive strength of concrete, table 6.7 
As Area of tensile reinforcement, see table 6.6 
b Height of cross section (wall thickness), see table 6.1 
d Depth of tensile reinforcement, see table 6.6 
L Breadth of cross section (wall length), see table 6.1 
Table 6.6 values for axial and impact loading of supports no. 2, 3 and 4 including reinforcement in walls 
 
In the case of support no. 3, which has fixed bearings between the support wall and bridge, 
equation (6.13) is permitted only if the reaction due to the impact force does not exceed the 
combined horizontal force resistances of the fixed pot bearings; i.e. if ∑≤ bearingRbearingimp HR ..  
then equation (6.13) applies, otherwise, equation (6.14a) and (6.14b) should be used. The 
characteristic horizontal force resistances for the pot bearings are given in section 6.3.1.1. The 
total reaction force at the bearings is given by equation (6.17) (Teknisk Ståbi 2004); refer to 
figure 6.17. 
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
H
aH
H
aFR impbearingimp 22
1 2
.  (6.17) 
Support 
no.
Normal 
force
Impact 
Force
Height of 
impact force
Depth of 
reinf.
N [MN] F imp  [MN] a [mm] no. x  Ø A s [mm
2 ] d [mm]
2 29,2 fig. 20 2,88 58 Ø25 56 941 705
3 27,2 fig. 21 3,05 118* Ø16 47 451 855
4 16,3 fig. 22 2,5 118 Ø16 47 451 855
* 234 @ connection between wall & foundations, 118 elsewhere
Tensile reinf.
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6.6.2.3 Probability of pylon failure given train derailment towards support 
The resulting impact force from a derailed train has been determined as well as two 
corresponding failure modes that should be considered. The resistances of the pylons 
attributed to these failure modes have also been determined. The next step is then to 
determine the probability of pylon failure given train derailment in the direction of one of the 
inner bridge support; i.e. case 1 to 3 from section 6.6. 
The two failure modes which will be analyzed are due to concrete failure in combined 
bending and axial action. The difference between the two is in the mechanism of failure; refer 
to figure 6.15. A limit state equation can be written which prescribes the conditions of failure 
of these two modes (no. 3 and 4): 
SxRx MMSRZ −=−=  (6.18a) 
or alternatively 
θsin. ⋅−=−= impRyyimpRy FFFFZ  (6.18b) 
where 
( )
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−⋅
⋅
=
4
3
4
3
Mode
a
M
Mode
aHa
HM
F
xR
xR
Ry  (6.19) 
The moment resistance for mode no. 4 is directly determined from equation (6.15) while the 
resistance for failure mode no. 3 is determined from expression (6.14b): 
)15.6(
/
4
3
equationM
HaMMM
xR
RBxRAxxR
=
⋅+=
 (6.20) 
The moment terms MRAx and MRBx are determined from equation (6.15); refer to figure 6.17. 
The probability of failure of the pylon is determined: 
( ) ( ) ( )00| . ≤−=≤= yimpRy FFPZPpylontowardstrainofderailmentfailurepylonP  (6.21) 
In order to determine the above probability, the statistical parameters of all stochastic input 
variables must be included. Furthermore, the JCSS Probabilistic Model Code (2001) includes 
uncertainty parameters for the load effects and resistances to account for model uncertainties; 
denoted by θE and θR respectively.  
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The limit equation (6.18b) can then be rewritten in the following form: 
( ) [ ]θθθθθ sin
4
3
4
3
. ⋅⋅−
⎪⎪⎭
⎪⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎪⎩
⎪⎪⎨
⎧
−⋅
⋅
⋅=⋅−⋅= impE
xR
xR
RyimpERyR F
Modefor
a
M
Modefor
aHa
HM
FFZ   (6.22) 
Inputting all basic variables, the full form is obtained for mode 4 (using equations 6.9b, 6.11 
& 6.15): 
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅Δ⋅⋅−
⋅⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅⋅=
obsE
csyR
ygv
s
m
a
xhxbfhdAfZ
ηθθ
αθ
2sin
2
14,0
2
8,0
2
2
0
  (6.23a) 
and mode 3: 
[ ] ( )
( )⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ⋅⋅⋅−⋅⋅Δ⋅⋅−
−⋅⋅⋅+⋅=
obsE
RBxRAxR
ygv
s
m
aHa
HHaMMZ
ηθθ
θ
2sin
2
/
2
0
  (6.23b) 
A Monte-Carlo simulation can then be done to determine the overall probability of failure. 
The basic variables that will be used for the probabilistic assessment of pylon failure given 
train collision are shown in table 6.7. The mean values and coefficients of variation for the 
basic variables pertaining to the resistance of the wall (see eq. 6.15) in table 6.7 were 
determined from Carlsson (2002) or assumed based on discussions with Professor 
Thelandersson and Dr. Carlsson. 
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Table 6.7 Parameters for Monte-Carlo simulation of probabilistic assessment of pylon failure given train collision 
 
 
Results of Monte-Carlo simulation 
The limit state equation (6.22) was input into the mathematical program MATLAB [A] and a 
Monte-Carlo simulation conducted to determine the probability of pylon failure given train 
collision as a result of derailment; i.e. the second probability term from equation (6.1). The 
simulation yielded results for supports no. 2, 3 and 4 corresponding to cases 1 to 3 given 
earlier in section 6.6. Figures 6.19,  6.20 and 6.21 show the empirical cumulative distribution 
function for the action effect (train collision) and resistance for supports no. 2, 3 and 4 
including uncertainty parameters for both (θE and θR respectively). The resulting failure 
probabilities are also shown. 
Basic Variable Symbol Distribution Dimension Parameters mean
Coeff. of 
variation
[Dist] X i ϵ Dist.(m,s) μ X V X
Perpendicular distance to 
support
y obs Determin. m - (table 6.1) ‐
Wall breadth b Normal mm h ϵ N(μ,σ) (table 6.1) 0,025
Wall length L Normal mm h ϵ N(μ,σ) (table 6.1) 0,025
Wall height H Determin. m - (table 6.1) ‐
Mass of train m Normal tonnes m ϵ N(μ,σ) 6.3.1.3 0,1
Derailment velocity v 0 Lognormal m/s v 0  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) (table 6.2) 0,1
Actual derailment angle θ Rectangular ° θ ϵ R(0,θ max ) varies varies
Maximum derailment angle θ max eq. (6.3) ° θ max = C/v 0 ‐ ‐
Constant to find  θ max C Lognormal rad sec / m C ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 3,5 0,5
Friction of surface η Lognormal ‐ η ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 0,5 0,5
"Shortening" of train Δs Lognormal m Δs ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 1,5 0,1
Compressive concrete strength f c Lognormal Mpa f c  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 43 0,12
Yield strength of reinforcing 
steel
f y Lognormal MPa f y  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) 670 0,05
In‐situ parameter α Determin. ‐ - 0,85 ‐
Reinforcement area A s Normal mm2 A s  ϵ N(μ,σ) (table 6.6) 0,02
Depth of reinforcing bars from 
wall edge d Normal mm d  ϵ LN( λ,ζ) (table 6.6) 0,05
Axial loading on wall N Lognormal MN N ϵ LN( λ,ζ) (table 6.6) 0,1
Distance of force from wall 
base a Normal m a ϵ N(μ,σ) (table 6.6) 0,05
Uncertainty of resistance θR Lognormal ‐ θR ϵ LN(λ,ζ) 1 0,1
Uncertainty of load effect θE Lognormal ‐ θE ϵ LN(λ,ζ) 1 0,15
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Figure 6.19 Empirical CDFs for the action effect (train collision) versus resistance for support no. 2 
 
 
Figure 6.20 Empirical CDFs for the action effect (goods/commuter train collision) versus resistance for support no. 3 
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Figure 6.21 Empirical CDF for the action effect (train collision) versus resistance for support no. 4 
The resulting impact forces in each case may be compared with prescribed collision forces 
given in the structural building codes. Two examples are presented here: 
(1) prEN 1991-7:2003  (Eurocode – Accidental loading) 
(2) Bro 2004 (Swedish bridge standard) 
(1) Eurocode specifies the impact force from a train collision to a bridge support, depending 
on the perpendicular distance of the support to the rail center line (analogous to yobs), for: 
• y < 3 m to be specified for the particular project 
• 3 m ≤ y ≤ 5 m 4000 kN parallel to track and 1500kN perpendicular to track 
• y > 5 m 0 kN for both 
where for traffic speed < 50 km/h force values are reduced by half and for > 120 km/h design 
forces and any additional preventative measure shall be specified in the National Annex or for 
the particular project. The location of the force is at a level 1,8m above the rail track 
elevation. 
(2) Bro 2004 also specifies the collision force for varying distances: 
• y < 5 m 4000 kN parallel to track and 2000kN perpendicular to track 
• y > 5 m 2000 kN parallel to track and 1000kN perpendicular to track 
these values are to be used if nothing else is specified for the particular project. The location 
of the force is at a level 1,0m above the rail track elevation. 
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The recommended values from structural codes may be compared with the 95th and 98th 
percentile values (for the perpendicular force component) found from the analysis, refer to 
figures 6.19, 6.20 and 6.21: 
(The speed limits and rail distances for these supports are shown in table 6.2.) 
SUPPORT 2 
• Analysis 95th  ~1,1 MN 98th  ~1,5 MN 
• ENV 1991-1-7 750 kN 
• Bro 2004 2000 kN 
 
SUPPORT 3 
• Analysis* 95th  ~1,3/3,1 MN 98th  ~2,1/3,9 MN 
• ENV 1991-1-7 0 kN** / specific analysis required (speed > 120 km/h) 
• Bro 2004 1000 kN for both 
 
*      values given for goods/commuter train collision 
**    since distance between track and rail is greater than 5 m 
 
SUPPORT 4 
• Analysis 95th  ~3,2 MN 98th  ~3,9 MN 
• ENV 1991-1-7 specific analysis required (speed > 120 km/h) 
• Bro 2004 1000 kN 
 
In all cases the prescribed force in both structural codes is less than what was calculated with 
the Monte Carlo simulation. Thus in the case of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge (and based on the 
results from the mechanical train collision model used in this paper) the inclusion of train 
impact loading from structural codes in the design procedure does not exclude it as a pertinent 
hazard scenario to be considered for a robustness analysis.  However, it is difficult to arrive at 
any legitimate conclusion without further investigation. Furthermore, the validity of the 
mechanical crash model developed in this paper cannot be substantially verified without more 
complex and thorough analyses. 
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6.6.3 Indirect consequences of pylon collision 
The previous sections have examined the direct effects of pylon collision as a result of train 
derailment; i.e. the effects to the support itself. The probability of pylon failure was 
determined for supports no. 2, 3 and 4. Given that one of these supports fail, the so-called 
indirect consequences to the bridge system can be analyzed. This involves a check of the 
residual capacity of the impaired structure. Intuitively it may be observed that the design of 
the post-tensioned concrete deck for a fully functioning bridge will be decisively inadequate 
given removal of one of its inner supports. A deterministic analysis will thus be done initially 
to check the degree of lessened structural integrity given pylon removal. Since the system is 
no longer static, the dynamic effects of sudden pylon removed must be considered. In absence 
of any dynamic studies, self-weight will be increased by 50% to account for these effects9; i.e. 
a dynamic amplification factor of 1.5 will be adopted. 
The various failure modes for the bridge deck given pylon removal will be considered. In the 
event of support removal, the span between the remaining adjacent supports increases 
resulting in moment redistribution. The first mode of failure for an impaired bridge structure 
is the failure of the bridge deck in bending. A plastic analysis may be conducted to check the 
moment capacity of the bridge span given failure of one of its supporting elements. The 
second failure mode is a continuation of the first. In the event that the bridge deck yields 
catenary action may aid in retaining some residual load carrying capacity such that the bridge 
deck does not fail completely. However, the first mode of failure will only be checked in this 
section of the report. 
The behavior of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge given failure of one of its supports will be 
examined. The resistance of the bridge deck will be determined given pylon removal for 
permanent loading only; i.e. self-weight. Table 6.8 shows the effective characteristic 
distributed line loading of the bridge deck for each span from self weight loading. 
Table 6.8 Distributed linear loading of bridge deck for all spans from self-weight (without dynamic factor) 
 
                                                 
9 According to Schubert et. al 2007, an additional 50% of the normal force that acted on the removed support 
could be considered. An approximation will be assumed that loading due to dynamic effects will be 50% of the 
self weight loading of the bridge deck instead. 
Span Length
Deck effective 
breadth
Loading on 
bridge*
L [m] b [m] q [kN/m]
1‐2 35,925 13,1 ~550
2‐3 50,000 13,1 ~550
3‐4 36,000 13,1 ~550
4‐5 28,475 13,2 ~450
5‐6 22,000 13,2 ~450
* Self weight loading only (characteristic)
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The moment distribution for a fully functioning bridge may be compared with an impaired 
bridge structure in which one of the inner supports is removed; i.e. supports no. 2, 3 or 4. 
Figure 6.23 shows the influence diagram for the moment distribution in the bridge deck for a 
uniformly distributed load according to table 6.8. The influence lines for an unimpaired and 
impaired structure (i.e. given pylon removal) are shown. Figure 6.22 shows a typical cross 
section for the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge.   
 
 
Figure 6.22 Cross section of the bridge deck for Sjölundaviadukt Bridge.
72 
 
 
-5
00
-4
00
-3
00
-2
00
-1
00010
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
0
20
40
60
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
Moment [MNm]
L
oc
at
io
n 
al
on
g 
br
id
ge
 [m
]
Sj
öl
un
da
vi
ad
uk
t:
 M
om
en
t d
ia
gr
am
 fo
r p
yl
on
 re
m
ov
al
U
ni
m
pa
ire
d 
st
ru
ct
ur
e
R
em
ov
e 
Su
pp
or
t n
o.
 2
R
em
ov
e 
Su
pp
or
t n
o.
 3
R
em
ov
e 
Su
pp
or
t n
o.
 4
q=
55
0k
N
/m
q=
45
0k
N
/m
Fi
gu
re
 6
.2
3 
M
om
en
t d
ia
gr
am
 fo
r 
Sj
öl
un
da
vi
ad
uk
t f
or
 fu
nc
tio
ni
ng
 st
ru
ct
ur
e 
vs
. r
em
ov
al
 o
f s
up
po
rt
s n
o.
 2
, 3
 a
nd
 4
 (d
yn
am
ic
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f p
yl
on
 r
em
ov
al
 n
eg
le
ct
ed
) 
73 
A plastic analysis will be carried out to determine the residual capacity of the bridge deck 
given removal of supports no. 2, 3 or 4 for loading given in table 6.8. This involves checking 
the residual moment capacities of the bridge deck for an impaired bridge structure. Two cases 
are considered: 
(1) Removal of the first inner supports nearest to bridge abutments (i.e. support no. 2) 
(2) Removal of other inner supports (i.e. supports no. 3 and 4) 
Figure 6.24 shows the resultant moment distribution for distributed loading q given removal 
of support no. 2 (case (1)) and 3 (case (2)). 
 
Figure 6.24 Moment distribution along bridge deck for removal of (a) support no. 2 and (b) support no. 3 (dynamic 
factor not included) 
The following condition must then be fulfilled (dynamic factor for load included): 
Case (1) 
8
5,1
2
2
sup.
.
LqMM RspanR
⋅≤+  (6.23a) 
Case (2) 
8
5,1
2
2
.sup..sup.
.
LqMMM BRARspanR
⋅≤++  (6.23b) 
a) 
b) 
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where the moment resistance of the bridge deck at any given cross section is determined from 
the ultimate tensile capacity of the post-tensioning cables (refer to appendix D): 
spcablesukcablesR AnfdM ⋅⋅⋅⋅= 9.0  (6.24) 
Equation (6.24) can then be used with equations (6.23a) or (6.23b) for removal of supports no. 
2, 3 or 4 to determine whether or not the residual load carrying capacity of the bridge is 
exceeded. The cross sectional data, including the number and position of the tendons, for 
various sections along the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge span is shown in table 6.9. 
Table 6.9 Data for cables at various locations along span of Sjölundaviadukt Bridge 
 
Results for residual load carrying capacity of bridge given pylon removal 
The following results were obtained for the residual load carrying capacity of the bridge deck 
for removal of supports no. 2, 3 and 4 using equations (6.23a) and (6.23b). 
Removal of support no. 2 
Effective span length:  L = ~86 m 
Loading from self weight:  q = 550 kN/m 
Control:  equation (6.23a) 
MNmLq
M
M RspanR 7638
865505,1
8
5,1
2
22
313.sup.
31.. ≈⋅=⋅≤+ −−  (6.25) 
 
 
Location along 
bridge
No. of 
cables
Cable group 
height
Deck height (at 
center line)
Description
m ea mm mm
+ 0,000 46 500/911 1400 Support no. 1
+ 13,472 46 137 1400 3/8‐span 1‐2
+ 35,925 58 ~2200 2400 Support no. 2
+ 42,963 76 ~900 ~1500 Mid‐span 1‐3
+ 60,925 88 137 1400 Mid‐span 2‐3
+ 78,925 70 ~770 ~1500 Mid‐span 2‐4
+ 85,925 52 ~2200 2400 Support no. 3
+ 103,925 38 137 1400 Mid‐span 3‐4
+ 118,163 48 ~1200 ~1800 Mid‐span 3‐5
+ 121,925 48 ~2000 2400 Support no. 4
+ 161,160 28 131 1100 Mid‐span 4‐5
+ 150,400 28 ~1500 1700 Support no. 5
+ 157,275 28 131 1100 5/8‐span 5‐6
+ 172,400 28 344/543/740 1100 Support no. 6
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Resistances at key locations along mid-span: 
a) mid span between support no. 1 and 3 
( ) MNmM spanR 131180076177090015009,031.. ≈⋅⋅⋅−⋅=−  (6.26a) 
b) support no. 3 
MNmM R 328180052177022009,03.sup. ≈⋅⋅⋅⋅=  (6.26b) 
Inputting equations (6.26a) and (6.26b) into equation (6.25) yields: 
MNmMNm 763295
2
328131 ≤≈+  (6.27) 
The capacity for removal of support no. 2 is less than half what is required. 
Removal of support no. 3 
Effective span length:  L = 86 m 
Loading from self weight:  q = 550 kN/m 
Control:  equation (6.23b) 
MNmLq
MM
M spanR 7638
865505,1
8
5,1
2
22
424.sup2.sup
42.. ≈⋅=⋅≤
++ −−  (6.28) 
Resistances at key locations along mid-span: 
a) mid span between support no. 2 and 4 
( ) MNmM span 147180070177077015009,042. ≈⋅⋅⋅−⋅=−  (6.29a) 
b) support no. 2 
MNmM 366180058177022009,02.sup ≈⋅⋅⋅⋅=  (6.29b) 
c) support no. 4 
MNmM 275180048177020009,04.sup ≈⋅⋅⋅⋅=   (6.29c) 
Inputting equations (6.29a), (6.29b) and (6.29c) into equation (6.28) yields: 
MNmMNm 763468
2
275366147 ≤=++  (6.30) 
The capacity for removal of support no. 3 is not adequate. 
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Removal of support no. 4 
Effective span length:  L = ~64,5 m 
Loading from self weight:  q = 450 & 550 kN/m, let q = 500 kN/m 
Control:  equation (6.23b) 
MNmLq
MM
M spanR 3908
5,645005,1
8
5,1
2
22
535.sup3.sup
53.. ≈⋅=⋅≤
++ −−  (6.31) 
Resistances at key locations along mid-span: 
a) mid span between support no. 3 and 5 
( ) MNmM span 831800481770120018009,053. ≈⋅⋅⋅−⋅=−  (6.32a) 
b) support no. 3 (see expression (6.26b)) 
c) support no. 5 
MNmM 120180028177015009,05.sup ≈⋅⋅⋅⋅=  (6.32b) 
Inputting equations (6.32a), (6.26b) and (6.32b) into equation (6.31) yields: 
MNmMNm 390307
2
12032883 ≤=++  (6.33) 
The residual capacity given removal of support no. 4 is not adequate. 
The residual load carrying capacities of the bridge deck given failure of supports no. 2, 3 and 
4 were all inadequate according to expressions (6.27), (6.30) and (6.33). A deterministic 
analysis was done for a check of the bending capacity from self-weight loading only. A 
dynamic amplification of 1.5 was considered to account for the effects of pylon removal. 
Given the degree of inadequate residual capacity for all cases, a probabilistic analysis will not 
be done and instead the probability of failure will be estimated. It seems likely that in all 
cases, if the aforementioned supports were removed, the bridge deck is not resilient enough to 
withstand the residual loading. Furthermore, the deterministic analysis did not take into 
account any live loading cases which may not be the case in actuality. Thus the probability of 
failure given pylon removal will be set equal to one for all cases: 
( ) 0,1| ≈∩ EDFP  (6.34) 
for removal of supports no. 2, 3 or 4. 
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6.7 Summary of results 
The previous sections considered the structural robustness of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge for 
the case of train collision to one of the supports as a result of derailment. The probability of 
the exposure event occurring was determined in section 6.6.1, the probability of the support 
failing was determined in section 6.6.2 and the effects of support removal was determined in 
section 6.6.3. The cases that were considered are the following: 
CASE 1) Derailment of goods train from tracks GBG06 and GBG07 towards support no.2 
CASE 2) Derailment of (a) goods train from track MSP59 and (b) commuter train from 
track SPS61 towards support no.3 
CASE 3) Derailment of commuter train from track SPS64 towards support no. 4 
The following give a summary of results from sections 6.6.2, 6.6.2 and 6.6.3: 
(i) Annual probability of exposure event (derailment towards support) 
CASE 1) ( ) 51 1085,1 −⋅=EP  
CASE 2) ( ) 62 1011,9 −⋅=aEP  
 ( ) 42 1051,3 −⋅=bEP  
CASE 3) ( ) 43 1056,3 −⋅=EP  
(ii) Probability of pylon failure given (i). 
CASE 1) ( ) 51 1060,1| −⋅=EDP  
CASE 2) ( ) 62 100,2| −⋅=aEDP  
 ( ) 52 1080,2| −⋅=bEDP  
CASE 3) ( ) 33 1090,4| −⋅=EDP  
(iii) Probability of bridge collapse given (i) and (ii). 
CASE 1) ( ) 1| 1 ≈∩ EDCP  
CASE 2) ( ) 1| 2 ≈∩ EDCP  
CASE 3)  ( ) 1| 3 ≈∩EDCP  
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The total probability of collapse is determined from equation (6.1).  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )∑∑ ∩=
i j
iijij EPEDPEDFPCP ||  
( ) [ ]
43
456655
1065,31090,41
1051,31080,21011,9100,211085,11060,11
−−
−−−−−−
⋅⋅⋅⋅+
⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅⋅+⋅⋅⋅⋅=CP
 
( ) [ ] 6691110 1080,11079,11083,91082,11096,2 −−−−− ⋅=⋅+⋅+⋅+⋅=CP  (6.35) 
The annual probability of failure of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge due to collisions from 
derailed trains is 61080,1 −⋅ . This value corresponds to a reliability index (equation 4.1) of: 
( ) 63,41080,1 611 =⋅Φ−= −−β  (6.36) 
for a reference period of one year, and 
( ) 75,3501080,1 6150 =⋅⋅Φ−= −−β  (6.37) 
for a reference period of 50 years 
These values correspond to reliability class RC1 (which prescribes the following minimum 
values: β1 > 4,2 and β50 > 3,3) and consequently consequence class CC1 according to 
Eurocode (see table 4.1 in section 4.1). The consequence class CC1 is a criterion reserved for 
structures with low consequences as a result of system malfunction or impairment; a class to 
which bridge structures should not adhere. The consequence of system malfunction for a 
bridge is high and the target reliability class should be set to at least RC2. It is thus unusual 
that given such a rare exposure event, the reliability index for system failure is so low. To 
help increase the structures integrity towards extraordinary or unknown events, such as train 
collision, design methods and strategies of robustness need to be considered. 
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6.8 Alternative robust solutions 
The results of the robustness analysis of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge determined that, for the 
case of train collision, additional considerations of robustness are required. There are various 
strategies, discussed in section 5.2, which could be implemented to help achieve this. These 
are: (1) first line of defense, (2) second line of defense and (3) prescriptive design rules. 
First line of defense 
The bridge could be re-designed to withstand these perturbations directly, although this may 
be uneconomical compared to other strategies. On the other hand, non-structural protective 
measures could be introduced which prevent train collision from occurring. The latter 
counter-measure is easier to achieve than the first when considering train derailments and 
collisions specifically. However, only considering one type of external exposure does not 
ensure a robust structure. There is always some risk that other unknown events occur for 
which the bridge was not designed for. 
Second line of defense 
Another solution would be to assume the local failure of some of the structural components of 
the bridge. The design would have to be altered to account for these failures. This could 
include introducing some redundancy in the bridge’s design by creating alternative load paths. 
For example, the design of the supporting elements could be changed from a wall structure to 
a series of columns. Then in the event of accidental removal of one or two columns, the 
remaining members are strong enough to resist the residual loading demands. Another 
example would be to redesign the bridge deck such that it can resist loading effects given the 
removal of one of the bridge supports. A third solution would be to design the bridge deck to 
allow catenary action in the event of deck failure. However, the degree of deformation 
required for this might be unacceptable given that railway traffic underneath the bridge could 
be hindered. 
The strategy of segmentation could also be considered in which an acceptable extent of 
collapse is prescribed to ensure failure does not progress to the entire structure. However, 
considering the relative small size of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge, it does not seem acceptable 
to allow for the failure of one or more of its 5 spans. 
Prescriptive design rules 
The inclusion of indirect design measures to help prevent the progressive collapse of the 
Sjölundaviadukt Bridge could aid in achieving greater structural robustness. However, even 
though prescriptive design rules help with some aspects of robustness it does not conclusively 
assure its effectiveness. 
In all cases, any change in design should be closely examined with regard to issues of 
robustness in mind. The bridge structure’s integrity for possible damage scenarios should be 
considered. The degree of analysis should be prescribed in the design criterion and 
requirements relating to robustness also given. 
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7. Conclusions and Discussion 
The property of structural robustness for bridge systems was investigated and a robustness 
analysis of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge conducted. The prior portion of the report addressed 
the importance of incorporating robustness in the design, construction and maintenance of 
bridge structures. The latter portion of the report investigated the robustness of the 
Sjölundaviadukt Bridge with regard to a specified hazard scenario: pylon collision from 
derailed trains. The objective of the report was to aid the reader in achieving a better 
understanding of the issues related to bridge robustness and provide an example that accounts 
for structural robustness considerations for a specified bridge structure. 
It is difficult to attempt at a prescribed design procedure which can be used to ensure 
structural robustness of arbitrary bridge structures. Each bridge should therefore be 
investigated on a case by case basis and specific design requirement for the robustness of the 
structure should be given. However, it is also difficult to determine these requirements 
explicitly and thus far no universally accepted measure of robustness has been developed. 
Thus it seems that when considering the structural robustness of bridge structures, much 
interpretation is required in order to attain any conclusive result. There are, however, various 
strategies and methods that have been developed to help increase the robustness of structures. 
Current design procedures were determined to be decisively inadequate with regard to 
considerations of structural robustness. A framework for the assessment of structural 
robustness of bridges requires additional methods of analysis to complement current design 
procedures. While reliability based design focuses on component based analysis and localized 
effects of hazard events, a systems approach is required which takes into account the 
consequences of localized damages for the bridge system as a whole. In cases where unknown 
perturbations must be considered, methods of analysis including investigation of the damage 
itself rather than its cause have been developed in an effort to account for these actions. 
However, if extraordinary exposures can be identified, an analysis may be done to determine 
a measure of robustness for the given event. A risk-consequence analysis is one way of 
achieving this in which individual perturbations and their associated risks are quantified and 
the proportionality of impaired function to the initiating cause may be identified. 
The robustness analysis of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge was conducted for the case of pylon 
collision given derailment of a train. The results of the analysis yielded a marginal annual 
failure probability of 61080,1 −⋅ . This value determined a reliability and consequence class 
below that which would be expected for a bridge structure. The bridge itself was designed 
according to conventional design procedures and included considerations of accidental 
loading including, specifically, train collision. Despite of this, considerations of robustness in 
the design of the bridge were not evident. Alternative bridge solutions were briefly discussed 
which could help in attaining a more robust structure. 
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Appendix A. Train derailment – simplified model 
A.1 Mechanics of derailment   
Consider a train, represented by a single mass m, moving with constant speed v0 along a 
straight railway track. The train suddenly derails at an angle θ from the original direction of 
travel. A simple mechanism for derailment can be adopted by assigning a lateral force, F, 
assumed uniformly distributed along the side of the train. The force is located along the 
surface between the wheel and track on one side. As the train leaves the track, it decelerates 
and the velocity at an arbitrary point along the derailment path may be determined. It is 
assumed that the train keeps along the same linear derailment path as shown in figure A.1. 
 
Figure A.1 Simplified mechanics for a derailed train car 
The derailed train travels along a straight path at derailment angle, θ, with an initial velocity, 
v0.derailment, and immediately begins to decelerate. The stopping distance of the train, s, depends 
on the derailment speed, the derailment angle, and the friction properties of the surrounding 
soil; refer to figure A.2. 
 
Figure A.2 Definition of stopping distance for derailed train 
The value Δy is a geometric parameter that takes into account the lateral movement of the 
train during derailment; for further simplification this value will be taken as zero: Δy = 0 
(which is not unlikely given smaller derailment angles). 
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The stopping distance of a derailed train can be determined for a given derailment speed, 
v0.derailment. A simplification is introduced which assumes that the initial velocity after 
derailment may be taken as the velocity of the train just as derailment occurs: 
v0.derailment = v0 
As the train travels along an angle θ on the surrounding soil, it decelerates due to a friction 
force gmR ⋅⋅=η . The force exerted by the train as it decelerates (at any given time, t) must 
be equal to the reacting friction force R (the energy loss to other forms such as sound and heat 
is neglected): 
( ) g
m
R
dt
dvR
dt
dvmtF ⋅−=−=⇒−=⋅= η
 (A.1) 
Thus the speed after time t is: 
( ) tgvtv ⋅⋅−= η0  (A.2) 
The time needed for the train to stop is then found (i.e. t for v(t) = 0):  
( ) gvttv ss η/0 0=→=  (A.3) 
The stopping distance, s, is the integral of velocity from equation (A.2) over the time it takes 
the train to come to rest, ts: 
2
2
0
s
s
tgtvs ⋅⋅−⋅= η
 (A.4) 
inserting equation (A.3) into (A.4) yields 
g
vs η2
2
0=
   (A.5) 
A.1.1 Velocity at impact 
The velocity at impact for a derailed train will be determined. Equation (A.5) may be 
rewritten such that the stopping distance, s, is set to the distance from the point of derailment 
to a support, sobs, for a given derailment angle θ. Then the time needed for the train to collide 
with the support is obtained. 
obsobsobs
obs
obsobs stvt
gtgtvs −⋅+⋅⋅−=⇒⋅⋅−⋅= 02
2
0 2
0
2
ηη  
g
sgv
g
vt obsobs η
η
η
⋅⋅−−= 2
2
00  (A.6) 
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Inserting equation (A.6) into equation (A.2) yields the velocity at impact: 
( ) obsimpobsobsimp sgvvtgvtvv ⋅⋅−=⇒⋅⋅−== ηη 2200  
θη sin2
2
0
obs
imp
ygvv ⋅⋅−=  (A.7) 
A.1.2 Force at impact 
The velocity of a derailed train when it collides with a column can be determined from 
expression (A.7), the corresponding impact force, Fimp, from the train may be evaluated. 
There are various methods for determining this force including kinematic and stiffness 
relations. Here two separate simplified methods for determining Fimp are considered: (1) 
impulse momentum equilibrium and (2) energy equilibrium. It will be assumed that the pylon 
is a rigid body and thus only the properties of the derailed train will be considered. 
The aforementioned methods for determining Fimp are based the following relationships: 
(1) The change in momentum that a body undergoes during collision is equal to the 
collision force times the impulse time, Δt (duration of collision): 
 tFvm impimp Δ⋅=⋅  
 
t
vm
F impimp Δ
⋅=⇒  (A.8a) 
(2) The work done by a body during a collision is equal to the kinetic energy generated at 
impact: 
 
2
2
imp
imp
vm
sF
⋅=Δ⋅  
 
s
vm
F impimp Δ⋅
⋅=⇒
2
2
 (A.8b) 
Δs      the distance in which the center of gravity of the body travels during collision; i.e. 
the “shortening” distance of the train in this case. 
Since neither Δt nor Δs can be explicitly determined, suitable estimations will need to be 
made. 
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A.2 Maximum derailment angle, θmax 
The tendency is for the train to rotate about its primary axis and possibly topple (roll) over 
during derailment. This is due to a reaction force from the mechanism of derailment, located 
at the contact point between the wheel and rail. This force lies below the center of gravity for 
the rail car and toppling becomes possible. If the train were to roll on its side during 
derailment its movement becomes more restrictive. Östlund et. al (1995) determined that a 
maximum derailment angle, θmax, for a given initial train speed, v0, determined whether or not 
the train would topple. The following inverse relationship between the derailment angle and 
derailment speed was found: 
m
radCwhere
v
C sec.5,3,
0
max =≈θ  (A.10) 
The above relation was determined based on the possible toppling of a locomotive engine but 
will be adopted to apply for goods- and passenger-trains for the purposes of simplification 
Figure A.3 is a graph showing the relationship between the derailment velocity and maximum 
derailment angle given in equation (A.10). 
 
Figure A.3 Maximum derailment angle plotted against derailment velocity 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
M
ax
im
um
 d
er
ai
lm
en
t a
ng
le
, θ
m
ax
[°
]
Derailment velocity, v0 [m/s]
91 
A.2.1 Statistical parameters for θmax 
The maximum derailment angle from equation (A.10) is linearly dependent of a variable C 
and inversely proportional to the initial speed at derailment v0. The prior will be assumed a 
random variable with a lognormal distribution with the following mean value, coefficient of 
variation and standard deviation (Östlund et al. 1995):  
m
sradVV
m
srad
CCCCC
⋅==⇒=⋅= 75,15,05,3 μσμ  (A.11) 
The derailment velocity v0 is also a random variable and it will be assumed that is follows a 
lognormal distribution. The mean value may be taken as the specified speed limit for the 
region of track being considered and a reasonable amount of variation will be assumed: 
00000
1,0. vvvvv VVvaluenom μσμ ===  (A.12) 
Thus the maximum yaw angle is a product of two lognormal random variables that are 
assumed statistically independent. By taking the natural logarithm of equation (A.10) we get: 
0max lnlnln vC −=θ  (A.13) 
This equation represents a sum of normally distributed random variables ln(C) and ln(v0) and 
thus ln(θmax) is also normally distributed. Which, by definition, means that θmax is a 
lognormally distributed random variable with the following mean and standard deviation 
(Nowak et al. 2000): 
0max lnlnln vC
μμμ θ −=  (A.14a) 
2
ln
2
ln
2
ln 0max vC
σσσ θ +=  (A.14b) 
where 
( )22ln 1ln ii XX V+=σ  (A.14c) 
( ) 2lnln 21ln iii XXX σμμ −=  (A.14d) 
The corresponding distribution parameters of the lognormally distributed variable θmax are 
then calculated by rewriting equations (A.14c) and (A.14d). 
with ( ) ( ) 2lnln22ln maxmaxmaxmaxmax 21ln1ln θθθθθ σμμσ −=+= andV  the following is yielded: 
1
2
maxln
max
−= θσθ eV  (A.15a) 
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and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ +⋅=⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ++= −− 2
1
22
1
2
ln maxmaxmaxmaxmax
1ln1lnln θθθθθ μμμ VV  
( )212
max
maxln
max
1 θ
μ
θ
θμ Ve +⋅=⇒  (A.15b) 
A.3 Minimum derailment angle, θmin 
The minimum derailment angle will be defined as the angle for which, given derailment, the 
stopping distance of the train is equivalent to the distance from the derailment point to the 
impact point; i.e. the train reaches zero velocity just as it approaches the pylon. In order to 
determine the minimum yaw angle for pylon collision given derailment, the post-derailment 
behavior of the train must considered.  
The formula for the stopping distance of a derailed train is given in equation (A.5). To 
determine the minimum derailment angle, the stopping distance will be set equal to the 
distance between the point of derailment and the support: s = sobs. For a given perpendicular 
distance of an obstruction from the center of the track, yobs, the following minimum 
derailment angle can then be formulated (refer to figure A.2 and figure 6.11): 
( )
obs
obs
obsobs s
yyyys Δ+=→Δ+= −1minmin sinsin/ θθ  (A.16) 
Inputting equation (A.5) into equation (A.16) and letting Δy = 0, the minimum yaw angle 
becomes: 
2
0
11
min
2sinsin
v
gy
s
y obs
obs
obs ⋅⋅== −− ηθ  (A.17)  
A.3.1 Statistical parameters for θmin 
The minimum derailment angle from equation (A.17) is dependent on the derailment velocity, 
v0, the perpendicular distance from the track to the support, yobs, and the friction coefficient of 
the surrounding soil, η: 
• The velocity at derailment, v0, follows a lognormal distribution with a coefficient of 
variation given in expression (A.3).  
• The perpendicular distance from the rail tracks to the support, yobs, is assumed 
deterministic and depends on which support is being analyzed.  
• The friction coefficient of the surround soil, η, will be modeled as a random variable 
with a lognormal distribution. 
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Friction coefficient η 
The friction coefficient is hard to determine without more detailed empirical investigation of 
the site. It is dependent on the surface properties of the soil including climactic influences 
such as frost or dampness. Figure A.4 shows various values for θmin given different friction 
coefficients, η, for derailment of a train towards support no.2.  
 
Figure A.4 Minimum derailment angle vs. derailment velocity for support no. 2 (yobs = 3m) given varying soil friction 
coefficients 
The mean value for η will be assumed at 0,5 and considering the degree of uncertainty to its 
actual value, a relatively large coefficient of variation will be assumed (Östlund et. al 1995): 
25,05,05,0 ==⇒== ηηηηη μσμ VV  (A.18) 
The statistical properties of the minimum yaw angle, θmin, can now be determined.  
The following simplification can be made to equation (A.17): 
(from first order Taylor series for f(x) = sin-1 x ≈ x): 
gyKwhere
v
Kofvaluessmallfor
v
gy
v
gy
obs
obsobs 222sin 12
0
12
0
2
0
1
min =⋅≈= − ηηηθ  (A.19) 
NOTE: from Figure A.5 it can be seen that the first order Taylor approximation from eq. 
(A.19) is acceptable for ca. θmin < 20 deg. This seems a reasonable approximation. 
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Figure A.5 First and second order Taylor approximation for arcsin x  
The statistical parameter for the minimum yaw angle from equation (A.19) can be determined 
in the same way as for the maximum yaw angle from the previous section. First, take the 
natural logarithm of equation (A.19): 
01min ln2lnlnln vK −+= ηθ  (A.20) 
where gyK obs21 =  
Thus θmin is a lognormally distributed random variable with the following distribution 
parameters: 
0min lnln1ln
2ln vK μμμ ηθ −+=  (A.21a) 
2
ln
22
ln
2
ln 0min
2 vσσσ ηθ ⋅+=  (A.21b) 
The lognormal distribution parameters for the derailment velocity v0 are given in (A.12).  
The standard deviation and mean value for a lognormal distribution of the soil friction 
coefficient, η, are determined using equations (A.14c) and (A.14d): 
( ) ( ) 223,05,01ln1ln 222ln =+=+= ηησ V  (A.22a) 
( ) ( ) 805,0223,0
2
15,0ln
2
1ln 2lnln −=⋅−=−= ηη σημμ  (A.22b) 
Using results that can be obtained from equations (A.22a), (A.22b) and (A.12), the lognormal 
distribution parameters for the minimum derailment angle can be determined from equations 
(A.21a) and (A.21b). The corresponding mean values and coefficients of variation are then 
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obtained analogously as for the maximum derailment angle (refer to equations (A.15a) and 
(A.15b)). 
1
2
minln
min
−= θσθ eV  (A.23a) 
( )212
min
minln
min
1 θ
μ
θ
θμ Ve +⋅=  (A.23b) 
A.4 Critical region for derailment, xcrit 
Now that the maximum and minimum derailment angles have been determined, the critical 
distance defined in equation (6.3) can be obtained. Equation (6.3) can be simplified by 
substituting the first order Taylor approximation for f(x) = 1/tan x ≈ 1/x (refer to Figure A.6): 
( ) ( ) maxminmaxmin tantan θθθθ
obsobsobs
obs
obsobsobs
obscrit
ybyLybyLx −++≈−++=  (A.24) 
 
Figure A.6 First and second order Taylor approximations for cotan θ
 A.4.1 Statistical parameters for xcrit 
Equation (A.24) is a nonlinear function of two random variables, both of which adhere to 
lognormal distributions. To solve this type of function a linearization can be performed using 
a first order Taylor series expansion of the random variable function, Y = f(θmin, θmax) = xcrit, 
and then estimating the mean and variance of the linearized function (Nowak et al. 2000). The 
“design point values” used for this determination are the mean values of the random variables 
θmin and θmax; i.e. minθμ  and maxθμ . 
( )
maxmin
maxmin, θθθθ
obsobsobs
obs
ybyLfY −++==  (A.25b) 
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then   
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )maxmin
max
maxmin
minmaxmin
,max
max
,min
min,
θθθθ μμ
θ
μμ
θθθ θμθθμθμμ ∂
∂⋅−+∂
∂⋅−+≈ fffY  (A.25b) 
The evaluation of the first order partial derivatives at the design points yields: 
( )
( )
( )
2
,min
2
minmin minmaxmin θμμ
μθθθ
θθ
obsobsobsobs byfbyf +−=∂
∂⇒+−=∂
∂  (A.26a) 
( ) 2,max2maxmax maxmaxmin θμμ μθθθ θθ
obsobs yfyf =∂
∂⇒=∂
∂  (A.26b) 
Substituting these values into the linearized equation (A.25b) and plugging in the mean values 
of the variables gives the following form of Y: 
( ) ( ) 2max2min
max
max
min
min
maxmin θ
θ
θ
θ
θθ μμθμμθμμ
obsobsobsobsobsobs
obs
ybyybyLY ⋅−++⋅−−−++=
 
(A.27) 
This will yield an equation in the following form: 
max2min10 θθ ⋅+⋅+= AAAY   (A.28) 
This is now a linear function of random variables in which the mean and variance of Y can be 
obtained: 
maxmin 210 θθ μμμμ ⋅+⋅+=≈ AAAYxcrit  (A.29a) 
22
2
22
1
22
maxmin θθ σσσσ ⋅+⋅=≈ AAYxcrit  (A.29b) 
with  
crit
crit
crit
x
x
xV μ
σ 2=  
where 
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Figure A.7 shows the critical lengths for train derailment at different velocities towards 
support no. 2 given the mean values of the minimum and maximum yaw angles, θmin and θmax, 
and varying values of the soil surface friction coefficient η. 
 
Figure A.7 Critical length for pylon collision for support no. 2 (yobs = 3m & bobs = 0,75m) for various soil friction 
coefficients 
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Appendix B. Probability of derailment 
B.1 Model for probability calculations of train accidents in 
Sweden 
The calculation model to determine the probability of train derailment on Swedish railroads 
(Fredén 2001) takes into account different causes of derailments and determines the expected 
number of derailments annually attributed to each cause. The expected number of derailments 
per year due to differing causes is determined by the following simple linear relationship of 
two variables: 
ξϕ ⋅=W    (B.1) 
where W is the so called exposure variable and ξ the corresponding intensity factor for the 
relevant causes given in table B.1 from (Fredén 2001). 
In this way the total expected number of derailments per year is then obtained as the sum of 
inter-dependent linear functions. 
∑ ⋅=
i
iiWP ξ0
   (B.2) 
There are two types of tracks that can be considered, those designated for goods trains and 
those designated for passenger trains. The probability of derailment is not the same for these 
situations and must be calculated separately. Refer to section B.2 for calculation of derailment 
for an arbitrary track length of 1 km for the goods train rails and passenger/commuter train 
rails in the vicinity of the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge. 
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Table B.1 Exposure variables and intensity factors for train derailment according to Fredén (2001) 
 
  
Accident type; cause Exposure variable (W)
Parameter 
/characteristic
Intensity 
factor (ξ)
Rail breakage no. cars x no. axles x rail km Rail class A 5,0E‐11
" " B 1,0E‐10
" " C 1,0E‐10
Heat distortion rail km Rail class A 1,0E‐05
" " B 2,0E‐04
" " C 2,0E‐04
Misaligned tracks, etc. no. cars x no. axles x rail km General 4,0E‐10
" " Double axle 9,0E‐10
" " Bogie 1,5E‐10
Snow and ice separate analysis required
Shear failure in soil, 
settlements, etc. separate analysis required
Worn or broken switch, 
etc no. trains through switch Main track 5,0E‐09
" " Side track 3,0E‐08
Misjudgment, human 
error, etc. " Main track 7,0E‐08
" " Side track 3,3E‐07
Railcar failure no. cars x no. axles x rail km Commuter train 9,0E‐10
" " Goods train 3,1E‐09
" " Other 1,0E‐10
Load redistribution no. cars x no. axles x rail km (part of load) 4,0E‐10
Sabotage separate analysis required
Other cause rail km 5,7E‐08
Unkown cause " 1,4E‐07
Derailment on railtracks
Derailment at railroad switch
Other causes
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B.2 Train derailment near Sjölundaviadukt Bridge 
The railroad tracks running under the Sjölundaviadukt Bridge are either designated for goods 
train or commuter train traffic and the probability of derailment on these tracks will be 
determined (a layout of the bridge and tracks is shown in figure 6.5 in section 6.2). In order to 
quantify the expected number of derailments per year the causes relevant for this case must 
first be identified; i.e. accident types shown in table B.1. The following lists show the accident 
types which will be considered as well as those which will be neglected. 
Relevant accident types: 
9 Rail breakage 
9 Heat distortion 
9 Worn or broke switch1 
9 Misjudgment, human error, etc. at railroad switch1 
9 Railcar failure 
9 Load redistribution 
9 Other cause 
9 Unknown cause 
Neglected accidental types: 
8 Misaligned tracks, etc. 
8 Snow and ice 
8 Shear failure in soil, settlements, etc. 
8 Sabotage2 
1 – depending on the length of the critical region 
2 – hard to quantify probability of sabotage 
 
The probability of train derailment for an arbitrary track length is calculated for tracks 
designated for both goods and commuter trains. The direction of traffic is designated for 
commuter trains on tracks SP61-64 while it will be assumed that tracks designated for goods 
trains allow for traffic in both directions. 
The relevant exposure variables that will be used to calculate derailment probabilities are 
listed above with reference to table B.1. Tables B.2 and B.3 show the calculated probability of 
derailment, P0 from equation (6.2) is section 6.6.1, for an arbitrary railway length of 1km in 
the area near the bridge for both goods trains and commuter trains. 
NOTE: derailment at the railroad switch is neglected. 
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Table B.2 Annual expected number of derailments for goods train tracks near Sjölundaviadukt Bridge; for traffic in 
both directions and track length = 1km 
  
 
 
Table B.3 Annual expected number of derailments for commuter train tracks near Sjölundaviadukt Bridge; for 
traffic in one direction and track length = 1km 
 
 
  
Accident type; cause
Exposure 
variable (W)
Intensity 
factor (ξ)
Expected no. 
occurences
Rail breakage 1,37E+06 5,0E‐11 6,86E‐05
Heat distortion 1 1,0E‐05 1,00E‐05
Worn or broken switch, etc 0 5,0E‐09 0,00E+00
Misjudgment, human error, etc. 0 7,0E‐08 0,00E+00
Railcar failure 1,37E+06 3,1E‐09 4,25E‐03
Load redistribution 1,37E+06 4,0E‐10 5,49E‐04
Other cause 3,43E+04 5,7E‐08 1,96E‐03
Unkown cause 3,43E+04 1,4E‐07 4,80E‐03
Total expected no. occurences per year, P 0 =  1,16E‐02
Other causes
Derailment on railtracks
Derailment at railroad switch
Accident type; cause
Exposure 
variable (W)
Intensity 
factor (ξ)
Expected no. 
occurences
Rail breakage 3,39E+05 5,0E‐11 1,70E‐05
Heat distortion 1 1,0E‐05 1,00E‐05
Worn or broken switch, etc 0 5,0E‐09 0,00E+00
Misjudgment, human error, etc. 0 7,0E‐08 0,00E+00
Railcar failure 3,39E+05 9,0E‐10 3,06E‐04
Load redistribution 3,39E+05 4,0E‐10 1,36E‐04
Other cause 5,66E+04 5,7E‐08 3,22E‐03
Unkown cause 5,66E+04 1,4E‐07 7,92E‐03
Total expected no. occurences per year, P 0 =  1,16E‐02
Derailment on railtracks
Derailment at railroad switch
Other causes
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Appendix C. Resistance of support wall 
C.1 Moment-Normal force graph 
An arbitrary reinforced concrete cross section with a combined uni-axial moment and normal 
force action is shown in figure C.1. The neutral axis is defined where the strain in the cross 
section is equal to zero and its depth from the top edge of the compressed section is denoted 
by x. An ultimate limit state design is adopted with a plastic rectangular stress distribution as 
shown in figure C.1. 
 
Figure C.1 Reinforced cross section with combined bending and axial force 
A moment-normal force graph can be created which takes into account the combined effect of 
axial and bending forces. The different values on the graph depend on the depth of the neutral 
axis as shown in figure C.2. The part of the graph marked balanced reinforcement refers to the 
condition in which the concrete fails at exactly the same moment as the reinforcement fails; 
i.e. the strain in concrete is εc = εcu (ultimate strain = 3,5‰) and the strain in reinforcement is 
εs = εsyd (yield strain = 2,17‰). The part of the graph marked pure bending is for a cross 
section without any axial force, N, in which the reinforcement yields before the concrete fails; 
i.e. εc = εcu and εs > εsyd. Thus in both cases, the force in the reinforcement can be determined 
from equation (C.1) 
sys AfF ⋅=   (C.1) 
where fy is the yield strength of the reinforcing steel. 
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Figure C.2 Moment-normal force graph for concrete cross section 
The depth of the neutral axis for both cases is then determined from equations (C.2) and (C.3) 
(neglecting the contribution of the compressed reinforcement). 
dx
cusyd
cu
bal ⋅+= εε
ε  (C.2) 
bf
Af
x
c
sy
pb ⋅⋅⋅
⋅=
8,0α  (C.3) 
where b is the breadth of the section and α = 0,85 is an in-situ parameter for the compressive 
strength of concrete.  
It follows then that for conditions between these two states (i.e. where xpb < x < xbal) the 
tensile reinforcement has yielded and equation (C.1) applies. In such a case, the following 
formula to find the depth of the neutral axis is determined: 
bf
AfN
x
c
sy
⋅⋅⋅
⋅+=
8,0α   (C.4) 
The moment resistance of the cross can then be determined by checking moment equilibrium 
about the center of the cross section. 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅−⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −⋅⋅= xhxbfhdAfM csyR 4,028,02 α  (C.5) 
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Equation (C.5) only applies if the depth of the neutral axis from equation (C.4) is between the 
values given by expressions (C.2) and (C.3). Table C.1 calculates these values for supports 
no. 2, 3 and 4 for mean values of fy, fc (refer to table 6.7). Refer to table 6.1 and table 6.6 for 
the geometry of the support walls including reinforcement. 
Table C.1 Calculation of neutral axis depth for supports no. 2, 3 and 4 
 
Equation (C.5) can thus be used to calculate the capacity of all supports. 
  
Support 
no.
x pb x x bal Check
[mm] [mm] [mm] ‐
2 112 198 435 OK
3 187 267 528 OK
4 93 141 528 OK
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Appendix D. Capacity of bridge deck 
The stress diagram for a post-tensioned cross section given bending moment M is shown in 
figure D.1. The capacity of the cross section is found by taking the moment about the center 
of the compressive region of the cross section (contribution of reinforcing steel neglected): 
spspspR AfzFzM ⋅⋅=⋅=  (D.1) 
an approximation is made that z ≈ 0,9d 
spspR AfdM ⋅⋅⋅= 9,0  (D.2) 
The moment resistance is calculated for the case of pylon removal and for such an extreme 
case, the tensile strength of the tensioning cable may be set equal to the ultimate strength: 
uksp ff =   (D.3) 
 
 
Figure D.1 Post-tensioned reinforced concrete cross section with bending action 
